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The availability of dependable, reasonably priced, and technologically
advanced telecommunications systems is essential to modern economies
and international trade. In European countries, until recently, national
monopolies, known as Postal Telegraph and Telecommunications Ad-
ministrations ("PTT"s),' controlled telecommunications. Each country
developed its own PTT, which monopolized telecommunications equip-
ment and service provision in its respective country.2 Cooperation be-
tween the PTTs was poor because of conflicting national standards,
incompatible equipment types, and monopoly restrictions. 3 As a result,
Europe suffered from poor telecommunications quality, prompting the
European Community (the "EC")4 to consider methods to effect change
in the market.
Despite EC efforts over the last decade, international telephone calls
1. The term PTT has become outdated because most European countries have cre-
ated a separate postal agency and removed the postal aspects from the original authority.
The remaining authorities are generally known as Telecommunications Operators. Nev-
ertheless, throughout this Note, the term PTT is used to refer to the European telecom-
munications establishment.
2. In the United States, AT&T developed similar characteristics. The European
PTTs, however, were actual government agencies, whereas AT&T was only a govern-
ment approved monopoly. See e.g. The New Boys; High Roads and Low Roads, The
Economist, Oct. 5, 1991, at 12, available in WESTLAW, MAG-ASAP File [hereinafter
The New Boys] (describing AT&T as "a sort of private-sector PTT"); Paul . Teske, After
Divestiture 1-2 (1990) (describing AT&T's growth to dominance in American telecommu-
nications). The PTTs' membership in such international organizations as the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union, its subsidiary organization, the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, and the Conference of European Pos-
tal and Telecommunications Administrations strengthened their influence. See James
Mark Naftel, The Natural Death of a Natural Monopoly: Competition in EC Telecommu-
nications After the Telecommunications Terminals Judgment, 6 Emory Int'l. L. Rev. 449,
451 (1992).
3. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 451-52.
4. The EC consists of twelve Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
See Treaty Between the Member States of the European Communities and the Kingdom
of Spain and the Portuguese Republic Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain
and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and to the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 9. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liech-
tenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland subjected themselves to most EC regulations
when they joined with the EC to form the European Economic Area. See Vivienne
Robinson, Recent Developments in the Law of the European Communities, 2 Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 1, 25-26 (1992). More recently, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined
the European Union, which is the umbrella organization over the EC. See Three Nations
Agree to Join EU, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1994, at A6. Although this Note will not discuss
the Nordic countries, their membership in the EU subjects them to the same European
telecommunications directives as EC Member States. See infra note 232.
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within the EC are more expensive than intra-American calls over the
same distance.' Also, international calls from Europe to the United
States are more expensive than the same calls originating in the United
States.6 Furthermore, there are fewer telephone lines per capita in Eu-
rope than in either Japan or the United States.
European users continue to face excessive delays for installation of tel-
ephone services. In Spain, the waiting list for phone installation numbers
244,000 orders, and in Greece the list contains over one million requests,
some of which will wait more than four years.' Even in Belgium, the
home of the EC headquarters, residents are sometimes forced to wait for
over six months to have basic service installed.9
Over the last decade, most theorists have come to agree that monopo-
listic control of the telecommunications industry results in lower quality
and higher costs.10 In response, European economists and legislators
have been calling for a change from the traditional, monopolistic control
of telecommunications services provision to an openly competitive mar-
ket. These theorists argue that Europe must allow the market to regu-
late itself through open competition in order to prepare the EC for
competition in the global telecommunications market.'" Hoping to ad-
vance the quality of European telecommunications, and to assist the eco-
nomic harmonization of the EC, 3 policy makers have been calling for re-
regulation, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization 4 of the Euro-
5. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 452.
6. See Anthony Ramirez, Hot- Wiring Overseas Telephone Calls, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1992, at DI [hereinafter Hot-Wiring].
7. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 450.
8. See Natasha Constantelou, Liberalizing Telecommunications Markets, 1993 Tele-
communications Policy 431, 435 (table 2).
9. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 452.
10. See Marc T. Austin, European Telecommunications Policy and Open Network
Provision: The Evolution of a Regulatory Methodology, 17 Fletcher F. World Aft. 97, 99-
100 (1993); Naftel, supra note 2, at 449.
11. Cf Called to Account, The Economist, April 24, 1993 at 18(2), available in
WESTLAW, MAG-ASAP File [hereinafter Account] (estimating that open competition
between European telecommunications firms would double the growth in demand for
telecommunications services over the next twenty years).
12. See Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development
of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290
final § (2)4 [hereinafter Green Paper]. The Green Paper is divided into three sections, the
first of which is essentially a preamble. Throughout this Note, references to the Green
Paper will be classified as § (1), (2), or (3).
13. See id. § (2)2. See also Constantelou, supra note 8, at 441-42 (referring to the
"belief that advanced communication systems can be used as tools to increase the cohe-
sion of the Community by solving social and economic problems and by overcoming
geographical inequalities").
14. These words, though often used interchangeably, actually have very distinct
meanings. Re-regulation is usually a first step whereby the government attempts to pre-
vent the monopoly provider from abusing its position. This can be achieved by supervis-
ing tariffs on private providers and the quality of service provided by the monopolist.
The next step, liberalization, is the encouragement of the private sector to compete with
the monopolist provider. Eventually this leads to deregulation, which aims to remove all
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pean PTTs.
In 1987, the European Commission (the "Commission") drafted the
Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecom-
munications Services and Equipment (the "Green Paper") 5 , which
called for deregulation of much of the European telecommunications
market. 16 The Green Paper called for the European countries to separate
their national service provider from their national policy maker.' 7 It also
required open competition in both the telecommunications terminal mar-
ket and the market for non-basic telecommunications services.'" The EC
has made significant movements towards these goals over the last seven
years. 
19
Despite its deregulatory goals, however, the Green Paper, and the di-
rectives that followed it,20 endorsed continued operation of the PTTs in
some aspects of the telecommunications market."1 Proponents of the
PTTs claimed that telecommunications should be considered a public
utility, justifying the PTTs' existence as natural monopolies.' They also
claimed that PTTs provided a public service and that, through monopoly
control of the network infrastructure, PTTs could offer the public econo-
mies of scale that a competitive telecommunications market could not
match.z3 Many people, however, disputed these supposed benefits and
governmental control, leaving the open market as the only regulator. Though the term
deregulation is used most often, it is a misnomer since true deregulation has not even
been achieved in the United Stated or the United Kingdom and will probably never be
achieved. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 433. Though many market analysts believe
that the movement towards "deregulation" enhances telecommunications quality, there
are some who criticize such a view for its unrealistic simplicity. See id. at 434.
Privatization represents a shift of the PTT's management from government control to
private ownership. This is usually done to raise capital or to increase operating efficiency
and technology. See id. at 433-34. Although privatization does represent a loosening of
the monopoly held by the PTT, it does not, in itself, induce competition. See The New
Boys, supra note 2. To effectively open the markets to competition, the national govern-
ments must also endorse anti-monopoly legislation.
15. See supra note 12.
16. See infra notes 96-131 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., Patrick Oster, Europe Finds Economic Unity Elusive Dream: Protection-
ism, Regulation Slow Efforts to Create Single Market, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1994, at HI,
available in WESTLAW, PAPERSMJ File (mentioning that the European telecommuni-
cations industry is already open to competition in the provision of equipment and most
data services).
20. See infra notes 132-201 and accompanying text. Directives are important legisla-
tive instruments in the telecommunications field that are issued by either the European
Commission or the European Council. They are addressed to, and are binding upon, the
Member States, and require implementation by national laws. See Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, reprinted in Treaties establish-
ing the European Community 207, 388 (Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg, 1987).
21. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
22. See Austin, supra note 10, at 98-99.
23. See icL at 99.
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began to demand open competition in all aspects of the telecommunica-
tion market.24
This Note examines the pressures that forced the PTTs toward deregu-
lation and studies the steps that have been taken to achieve deregulation.
In addition, this Note analyzes the present level of deregulation effected
by several EC Member States and the prospects for further deregulation.
Part I of this Note lists the many forces, both internal and external, that
have made impractical continued operation of telecommunication mo-
nopolies in Europe. Part II describes the steps taken by the European
Commission, the European Council of Telecommunications Ministers
(the "Council"), and the European Court of Justice to deregulate tele-
communications in the EC. Part III discusses the difficulties that com-
plicated, and continue to disrupt, the deregulation process. In an effort
to analyze the multinational deregulation process, Part III also surveys
eight individual European nations, grouped by their level of develop-
ment." Finally, this Part examines the forces battling for and against
further deregulation and hypothesizes on the future of the PTTs. This
Note concludes that the EC has successfully established a trend towards
deregulation, exemplified by the recent proposal for deregulation of the
voice telephony market, 6 and will achieve deregulation of all telecom-
munications markets in Europe within the decade.
I. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE
EUROPEAN PTTs AS REGULATED MONOPOLIES
Despite the long-standing tradition of allowing PTTs to regulate and
provide telecommunications in Europe, many industry experts have criti-
cized the PTTs as inefficient and costly. In addition, several experts now
contend that the PTT structure is unsuited for global competition. De-
tractors also point out that PTTs, which are guaranteed monopoly con-
trol over their country's market, have no incentive to standardize their
systems with other European countries. What follows is an analysis of
the factors that have made it difficult for monopolistic PTT operation to
satisfy European users or to achieve EC telecommunications goals.
24. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
25. This distinction is important when analyzing telecommunications development
and deregulation. The more developed, "northern," countries have national policies that
consider competition and liberalization in the telecommunications market as tools for
improved industrial performance. In contrast, national policy in the lesser developed,
"southern," countries is more conservative in light of moderate domestic industrial per-
formance and national economies based on the activities of small and medium-sized com-
panies. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 442.
26. See infra note 201. "Voice Telephony" has been defined as "the commercial pro-
vision for the public of the direct transport and switching of speech in real-time between
public switched network termination points, enabling any user to use equipment con-
nected to such a network termination point in order to communicate with another termi-
nation point." Commission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the




A. Rejection of P7T Advantages
Although PTTs claim that they are best able to provide national tele-
communications services, theorists have come to reject claims that mo-
nopolistic service benefits from economies of scale.27 Furthermore, these
theorists now doubt that PTTs truly serve the public interest.28 Drawing
support from the results of American telecommunications deregulation,
these theorists argue that the public would benefit from open
competition.29
One European analyst claimed that the installation of a greater
number of telephone lines in America than in Europe is a direct result of
the judicially required deregulation in America.3° Similarly, the United
States Federal Communications Commission concluded that "'the rise
of 1 million in the number of American households with a telephone in
1985-86 suggests that "universal service"[31 ] has not been affected by di-
vestiture.'- 32 In addition, since the early 1980s, deregulation has re-
duced the cost of American long distance services by forty percent.33
Based on these facts, many claim that services would similarly improve
and prices would drop significantly if European telecommunications
were opened to competition.34
B. The EC Standardization Goal
Many policy makers believe that EC deregulation will speed move-
ment towards the standardization of European telecommunications
equipment and services. 35 When left unregulated, the PTTs of individual
27. See Austin, supra note 10, at 99.
28. See id
29. "Recent technological progress and the experience of the United States suggest
that the 'natural' justification for upholding monopoly provision of telecommunications,
even in basic voice telephone service, is suspect." Naftel, supra note 2, at 462. As a
result, when examining fair competition cases, some critics in the EC have questioned
whether "natural monopoly" is a proper justification for anti-competitive practices. See
Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 441.
30. See Austin, supra note 10, at 99.
31. The term "universal service" has long been used as an argument against open
competition in telecommunications. It represents the theory that telecommunications
monopolies are better at providing equal service to all potential users. For a brief history
of the term, and an attack on its use to support telecommunications monopolies in the
United States, see, generally, Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History,
1993 Telecommunications Policy 352.
32. Austin, supra note 10, at 99 (quoting Jill Hills, Universal Service: Liberalization
and Privatization of Telecommunications, 1989 Telecommunications Policy 129, 137 (cit-
ing 1986 FCC figures)).
33. See The Price of Speechk Time to Bust the Cartel that Keeps International Tele-
phone Charges High, The Economist, July 6, 1991, available in WESTLAW, MAG-
ASAP File [hereinafter Price of Speech].
34. See Hugo Dixon, Reconnecting Charges with Costs, Fin. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at
20 [hereinafter Reconnecting Charges]; Hugo Dixon, Telephone Users Over-Charged by
World Cartel Operation, Fin. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Over-Charged by
World Cartel].
35. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)189. Through deregulation, the EC can
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European nations have established different national standards that pre-
vent cross-European uniformity. The PTTs wanted to retain complete
control over their respective country's market, so they purposely created
standards different from their neighbors, thus excluding foreign goods
from their national market.36 Deregulation rectifies this problem by sub-
jecting the PTTs to EC-wide interests, such as telecommunications
standardization. 7 Standardization works towards the "full interconnec-
tivity" of European telecommunications systems, which is necessary to
establish pan-European networks. 38 With unification through standardi-
zation, Europe can offer many new services and will also be better
equipped to battle non-European companies that try to establish de facto
world-wide standards by virtue of market dominance.3 9
The Council enunciated the important EC goal of establishing "Com-
munity-wide network integrity... [that] work[s] on the principle of full
interconnectivity"' in its directive endorsing the Green Paper. The EC
has three primary goals in the development of a European telecommuni-
cations network infrastructure: the development of Community-wide
"electronic highways," the establishment of pan-European mobile tele-
communications systems, and the creation of a new European regulatory
framework for satellite communications.4 1 These networks are a part of
the "trans-European" network infrastructure, the development and inter-
connection of which has been awarded "special priority" by the
Council.42
Two major steps are necessary to establish an international "electronic
establish a central European authority that can control standards throughout Europe and
move towards European networks. Cf Herbert Ungerer & Nicholas P. Costello, Tele-
communications in Europe 129 (rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter Ungerer] (discussing the
"need for policy formulation at Community level, in order to create a single Europe-wide
market").
36. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 452.
37. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)178.
38. Council Resolution on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommu-
nications Services and Equipment up to 1992, 1988 O.J. (C 257) 1, 2 [hereinafter Services
and Equipment Resolution]. The EC envisions pan-European networks in numerous
telecommunications markets such as Integrated Services Digital Network, Integrated
Broadband Communications, mobile telecommunications, and satellite communications.
See Christina N. Beaton, Telecommunications Law in the European Community, in Euro-
pean Community Law After 1992: A Practical Guide for Lawyers Outside the Common
Market 683, 687-88 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 1993).
39. See Austin, supra note 10, at 102-03. For example, in response to a question
regarding the American threat raised at a hearing held by the House of Lords Select
Committee in the European Community, one Commission official stated that American
standards have often become de facto international standards due to their extensive mar-
ket power. See id.
40. Services and Equipment Resolution, supra note 38, at 257/2.
41. See Joachim Scherer, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, in Telecommunica-
tions Laws in Europe 1, 5 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993). For an analysis of the latter two
objectives, see id. at 6-8
42. Council Resolution of 22 January 1990 Concerning Trans-European Networks,
1990 O.J. (C 27) 8. A recent paper released by the Industry Commissioner called on the
Commission to "mobilise to create pan-European telecommunications . . . ." Suzanne
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highway." First, the individual nations must enhance the capacity of
their existing network, which requires the digitization43 of their analog
lines." Second, these nations must standardize their networks so that,
by interconnecting the national networks, they can achieve a trans-Euro-
pean network.45 Once such a network is achieved, the EC hopes to im-
plement Integrated Services Digital Network ("Digital Network")46
technology throughout the system and, eventually, to operate its better
and faster successor, Integrated Broadband Communications ("Broad-
band Communications").47 The main objective of a key program for pro-
moting European network coherence, Research and Development in
Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe ("RACE"), is to
achieve "Community-wide introduction of [Broadband Communica-
tions] by 1995, taking into account the evolving [Digital Network] and
national introduction strategies."48
All European countries are already working on implementing plans to
adapt their national networks to Digital Network technology.49 As of
1991, five Member States were already reported to have introduced com-
mercial Digital Network systems, and five others to have launched exper-
imental systems.50 In an attempt to ensure that these developments will
eventually lead to a European network, the Council has promulgated leg-
islation to harmonize the Digital Network efforts in all European
countries.51
Perry, EC Urged to Mobilise on Computerised "Information Space", Reuter Eur. Commu-
nity Rep., Oct. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
43. Digitization is "the encoding, transformation, and transmission of any informa-
tion as bits.... ." Ungerer, supra note 35, at 35; see also Arval A. Morris, Germany's New
Telecommunication Law, 16 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 65, 72 n.19 (1989).
44. See Beaton, supra note 38, at 687.
45. See id) (describing the need for "a coordinated and interconnected network and
consistency in the provision of services and equipment").
46. "The Integrated Services Digital Network is an advanced, wholly integrated net-
work of digital transmission and switching systems that permits the simultaneous han-
dling of voice, data, and graphics with great speed and accuracy." Morris, supra note 43,
at 112 n.128.
47. "The Integrated Broadband Network is [Digital Network] plus broadband and is
the 'superpipe' specially constructed from fiber-optic cable and connecting every house-
hold, farm or business. It will carry a very wide range of television and other entertain-
ment plus all other rapidly expanding telecommunication services. [Digital Network] has
a primary access rage [sic] of 1.5 Mbps CTI or DSI rate, but the Broadband [Digital
Network] is being developed to carry transmissions of up to 150 Mbps." Id. at 112 n.129.
See also Beaton, supra note 38, at 687-88 (discussing the EC's plans for implementation of
Digital Network and Broadband Network technology).
48. Ungerer, supra note 35, at 153. For a brief description of RACE, see id. at 153-
57.
49. See Scherer, supra note 41, at 5.
50. See id. at 6.
51. For some examples of such legislation, see Council Recommendation 86/659 of
22 December 1986 on the Co-ordinated Introduction of the Integrated Services Digital
Network in the European Community, 1986 O.J. (L 382) 36; Council Resolution of 18
July 1989 on the Strengthening of the Co-ordination for the Introduction of the Inte-
grated Services Digital Network in the European Community up to 1992 1989 OJ. (C
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Deregulation was necessary to establish the EC's authority to control
the standards created by the individual European PTTs.52 Such control
is necessary if the EC hopes to achieve full interconnectivity. Strategists
also hope that deregulation will force nations to achieve finite deadlines
for the activation of pan-European telecommunications networks.5 3
C. New Technologies
Technological advances have complicated the PTTs' system of strict
regulation. Advances have merged historically unregulated computer
technology with historically regulated telecommunications technology. 54
For the most part, regulators have loosened control over telecommunica-
tions rather than tightened control over computer regulations." The
PTTs had owned and operated the physical infrastructure of hard-wire
lines, access to which was necessary to operate telecommunications serv-
ices, and the PTTs had easily prevented competition by restricting access
to the infrastructure. But technological advancements allowed competi-
tors to bypass parts of the PTTs' hard-wire system, minimizing the PTT
advantage.5 6
Cellular technology enabled the PTTs' competitors to provide tele-
communications services to users without accessing the hard-wire net-
work. By 1990, Europe had 3.4 million cellular subscribers." As
cellular technology advances, the price of service, relative to the use of
monopoly operated service, will drastically decrease, which will increase
the number of subscribers.5" Similarly, satellite technology allows the
196) 4; Council Resolution of 5 June 1992 on the development of the Integrated Services
Digital Network in the Community as an Europe-wide telecommunications infrastruc-
ture for 1989 and beyond 1992 O.J. (C 158) 1; and Council Recommendation 92/383 of 5
June 1992 on the Provision of Harmonized Integrated Services Digital Network Access
Arrangements and a Minimum set of Integrated Services Digital Network Offerings in
Accordance with Open Network Provision ("ONP") Principles 1992 O.J. (L 200) 10.
52. See Perry, supra note 42 (referring to the Industry Commissioner's claim that
breaking-up state monopolies in telecommunications markets would speed up the process
of creating pan-European networks).
53. See id.
54. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (2)2.
55. See id.
56. Cf Account, supra note 11 ("Telephone firms need to be as lean and competitive
as possible if they are to meet the challenge of the coming generation of wireless tele-
phones .... ).
57. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 487 n.175.
58. Some estimates claim that mobile services will gain market shares to the point
that 20-33% of all telephone calls will originate from mobile devices within 10 years. See
Nicholas Higham, Open Network Provision in the EC: A Step-By-Step Approach to Com-
petition, 1993 Telecommunications Policy 242, 246. Developments such as the advanced
wireless system Personal Communications Network, and the Personal Communications
Service, has been providing cellular service to more users in Britain. See Naftel, supra
note 2, at 487. There are already two million cellular subscribers in Britain, and the latest
venture in cellular phone provision, called Mercury One-2-One, has attracted over 40,000
subscribers and plans to expand quickly. See Richard L. Hudson, Phone Venture is
Called Bumpy But Promising, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1994, at A7.
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PTTs' competitors to relay telecommunications signals over long dis-
tances without accessing the government-owned hard-wire network.5 9
Proposals for satellite personal communications combines both satellite
and cellular technology to bypass completely the PTTsY'
Other technological developments will create more options that bypass
the government-owned infrastructure. The biggest example of this is the
advances in packet switching and optical fiber technology, which allow
line networks, such as cable, to compete in the telecommunications mar-
ket.6 Another potential source of competition comes from a recent in-
vention by Wavephore that allows the use of television bandwidths as
informational highways.62 The latest development in the United States
makes it feasible for even electric lines to carry information, thereby en-
abling electric companies to compete in the telecommunications
market.6
3
Private services have also adapted technologies to allow users to by-
pass Europe's high telecommunication services rates. 4 The most signifi-
cant such practice is commonly known as "leased lines."165  Other
59. See In Brief, Ariz. Bus. Gazette, Feb. 4, 1993, at 14, a'ailable in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File. Motorola Inc. recently
[m]et for the first time with a group of international investors in its $3.37 billion
Iridium project. The project is a global telecommunications network that
utilizes wireless telephones and 66 low-earth-orbit satellites. The initial inves-
tors include representatives from... Europe .... Together, they have signed
non-binding letters of intent to invest an initial $800 million in the project.
Launching of the Iridium satellites is scheduled to begin in 1996, with commer-
cial service anticipated in 1998.
Id
60. See. eag., P. Verhoef, The Introduction of Satellite Personal Communications in the
European Community, 60 Telecommunications J. 391 (1993) (describing various propos-
als for a technology that allows communications through mobile terminals linked by
satellite).
61. Originally, cable networks posed no threat to the PTTs because available technol-
ogy did not allow such a line network to provide telephone services. But advances in
optic fiber and packet switching technology now make it possible for a line network to
upgrade and provide such telecommunications services. See Morris, supra note 43, at 72-
72 n.21; Report: Towards the Information Superhighway, 1993 Telecommunications Pol-
icy 631 (describing advances in fibre-optics).
62. Though initial plans are limited to transmission from the television stations to
their contractors, this could become more widespread. This technology transmits data
nearly 40 times faster than standard telephone modems, and a subsidiary of the German
electronics conglomerate, Siemens AG, moved immediately to buy exclusive rights to
market it in Europe. See Guy Webster, High-Speed-Data Deal Signed, Arizona Republic,
July 30, 1993, at D6.
63. Electricity is provided through a line system, which could now be upgraded, like
cable networks, to provide telecommunications services. See Steven R. Rivkin, Look
Who's Wiring the Home Now, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1993, (Magazine) at 46-47.
64. See Commission of the EC, Panorama of EC Industry, Telecommunications Serv-
ices NACE 790 25-12, 25-14 [hereinafter Panorama] (European users now feel that "[i]f
they can't get satisfactory responses from established telecommunications operators, they
will increasingly look for alternative answers.").
65. "Leased lines" refers to an arrangement whereby a PTT leases an end-to-end tele-
phone wire connection to a user, usually a business with two major locations that wants
2167
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operations such as dial-back allows operators to transmit international
long-distance calls through hubs that offer less expensive rates.66 In a
dial-back operation, a European caller calls the dial-back operator in
America but hangs up after one ring. The American operator calls the
European caller back and then conferences him with the American party
he wants to reach.67 This allows the European callers to take advantage
of lower U.S. rates, and pierces the monopoly protection around the Eu-
ropean providers.
D. Foreign Competition
Free market reforms in other countries have forced Europe to defend
itself against aggressive new foreign competitors. 68 The EC telecommu-
nications market share is worth 80 billion ECUs, almost one quarter of
the global market. 69 Foreign competitors are eager to tap into Europe's
tremendous telecommunications market.7v
Many of the biggest international competitors in the European market
are American companies.71 The 1982 break-up of "Ma Bell" allowed
AT&T to compete internationally and increased the number of other
companies seeking a share of the European telecommunications mar-
ket.72 In April 1993, AT&T applied to Britain's Department of Trade
and Industry for permission to operate a range of telecommunication
services in and out of Britain.73 US Sprint International and MCI, two
companies created in anticipation of American deregulation, have since
become major competitors with AT&T for telecommunications services
to network its entire operation. Due to the potential for "cream skimming," the PTTs
established restrictive conditions under which they would lease such lines. See Morris,
supra note 43, at 103 & n. 102. But recent directives have forced the PTTs to offer leased
lines at non-discriminatory rates. See Council Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1992 on the
Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165). This most
recent such directive was essential for many new entrants who could not provide their
own fixed networks.
66. See Austin, supra note 10, at 102; Matt Moffett, "Callbacks" Cut Telephone Bills
of Users Abroad, Wall St. J., June 21, 1994, at BI, B2.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 101; John Williamson, Europe 1992: Closer to the Horizon, 221 Teleph-
ony 26, Dec. 2, 1991, available in WESTLAW, MAG-ASAP File. In fact, one British
insider claimed to expect foreign competition to have as many deregulatory effects on
European telecommunications as all of the EC's deregulatory legislation. See id.
69. See Austin, supra note 10, at 100 (setting the global market value at 300 billion
ECUs at a time when one ECU was valued at $1.18).
70. Foreign competitors' entry into the market is accelerated since "[s]ignal digitali-
zation, fiber optic cables, intelligent networks, and satellites have multiplied the range
and number of applications for telecommunications as well as reduced the cost of provid-
ing basic and advanced services." Austin, supra note 10, at 100.
71. See In Brief, Ariz. Bus. Gazette, Sept. 9, 1993, available in WESTLAW, PAPERS
File ("The US telecommunications industry's penetration of the European market is 'a
striking success story' in a part of the world where government owned monopolies con-
trol 85 percent of the phone business, says a congressional study.").
72. See Austin, supra note 10, at 101.
73. See Account, supra note 11.
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in Europe.74 In fact, Sprint even attempted to become one of Britain's
basic telecommunication services providers. 5 Furthermore, the Ameri-
can divestiture created Regional Bell Operating Companies.76 These
companies have since expanded into international markets, primarily in
the fields of fiber-optics, cellular technology, and cable television."
European companies would also stand to benefit if provided a similarly
deregulated environment.78 Many market analysts feel that Europe must
deregulate to strengthen the competitive edge of European companies so
that they can compete in a non-restricted trade environment. 9 In addi-
tion, countries that have opened their telecommunications markets to
competition, such as the United States and Japan,80 have placed political
pressure on the EC to do the same.81
E. Customer and P7T Dissatisfaction
European users, plagued by poor service, have also called for PTT de-
regulation. Despite the great steps taken towards deregulation since the
Green Paper, European users and suppliers are still dissatisfied with the
74. See Austin, supra note 10, at 101.
75. See id.; Account, supra note 11.
76. See Teske, supra note 2, at 5 (The AT&T divestiture placed the 22 Bell Operating
Companies under the authority of seven Regional Bell Holding Companies.).
77. For example, Pacific Telesisis is competing in the German cellular phone market
and Bell Atlantic has entered the Italian telecommunications services market. See Pat-
rick Oster, Dialing for European Phone Dollars Breakup of Overseas Monopolies Could
Benefit U.S. Companies and Beleaguered Customers, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1993, available
in WESTLAW, PAPERSMJ File. In addition, US West is partners with British, Scandi-
navian, and French communications companies. See US West A Leaner Meaner Baby
Bell With Global Ties, Phoenix Gazette, May 18, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
PAPERSMJ File; Cynthia Johnson, Europe Seen Still Contender In Multimedia Race,
Reuters Bus. Rep., Nov. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File;
Hudson, supra note 58, at A7.
78. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 450.
79. See Ungerer, supra note 35, at 223-24 C" '[T]here is no alternative to exposing
[European] industry to competition, relying on European ingenuity and competence to
confront non-European competitors'" (quoting a speech delivered to the 1987 Financial
Times World Telecommunications Conference by Mr. Narjes, Vice-President responsible
for telecommunications in the Commission)); Michael Schrage, Europe Lags in the Race
to Develop and Distribute New Technologies, Wash. Post, July 9, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, PAPERS File (discussing the threat of foreign infiltration of European tele-
communications markets, stating that "Europe's best hope is in influencing global tech-
nology standards, not trying to use them as tools for protectionism"); William Drozdiak,
Europe's Leap Towards Unity in '93 Falls a Bit Short, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 1992, avail-
able in WESTLAW, PAPERS File. The president of the EC's executive commission,
Jacques Delors, insisted that Europe must institute "cross-border mergers and painful
restructuring programs" in order to face American and Japanese competition. He also
warned that "[i]f [Europe] lapse[s] back into nation-first policies, [it] will become a third-
rate power." Id.
80. See Green Paper supra, note 12, § (3)155 (discussing both the United States and
Japanese deregulation). Much has been written about the American divestiture. See.
eg., Teske, supra note 2. For a brief discussion of Japan's telecommunications deregula-
tion, see Ungerer, supra note 35, at 109-13.
81. See Austin, supra note 10, at 102.
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present state of the telecommunications market.8 2 One estimate indicates
that the incompatible technologies between Member States caused ap-
proximately one-fourth of all data traffic sent across Europe to fail to
reach its destination. 3 That, and the fact that prices for telecommunica-
tions in Europe are much higher than in the United States, 4 has driven
European users to demand further deregulation of the PTTs in the hope
of obtaining better and more reasonably priced telecommunications
services. s5
Even some PTTs are finally asking for further Europe-wide deregula-
tion. A European Commission study determined that absent further de-
regulation, the EC market for telecommunications service will grow by
only 3-4% a year.8 6 Because this same report calculated that deregula-
tion could lift growth to 6-7% - quadrupling the size of the market over
the next 20 years - Spain, Denmark, Holland, and even Germany have
joined British telecommunications suppliers in advocating rapid deregu-
lation of voice telephony. 7
The European Commission has established itself as a primary force in
the difficult job of guiding and unifying the deregulation process.8, The
pressures of competition from new technologies and new competitors as-
sisted the Commission when it began its deregulation efforts seven years
ago. The present call for better service lends support to the Commis-
sion's continued attempts to open all European telecommunications mar-
kets to competition.
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ATTEMPT TO STANDARDIZE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES AND TO
FOSTER COMPETITION
The Commission has released a significant amount of deregulatory leg-
islation over the past seven years.8 9 It began, in 1987, by releasing the
Green Paper on Telecommunications Services and Equipment (the
"Green Paper").9 ° Based on authority established in the Green Paper,
the Commission subsequently released two major directives: the Termi-
82. One multi-national survey showed satisfaction with existing telecommunications
provision to vary from 89% in France, down to 23% in Italy. See Europe's Companies
Back Telecoms Liberalization, Survey Shows, Reuters European Reports, Sept. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also Panorama, supra note 64, at
25-14 ("European users are now becoming as vocal as their American counterparts about
the fact that their needs must be met both functionally and economically.').
83. See Austin, supra note 10, at 101.
84. See Account, supra note 11 (One estimate states that "[c]alls between EC coun-
tries cost up to six times as much as long-distance national calls.").




88. See Austin, supra note 10, at 103.
89. See infra notes 96-158 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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nal Equipment Directive,9 1 and the Telecommunications Services Direc-
tive.9 2 In conjunction with the Commission's Telecommunications
Services Directive, the European Council released a directive on the im-
plementation of open network provisions (the "ONP Directive")93 that
further delineated the deregulation required of the PTTs. To explain
what type of inter-company agreements violate competition laws, the
Commission released the Guidelines on the Application of Competition
Rules (the "Guidelines").94 Both the Council and the Commission have
continued to endorse further deregulation, most recently with a proposal
for open competition in the voice telephony market."
A. The Green Paper
In 1987, after studying telecommunications in the EC, the Commis-
sion issued the Commission Green Paper on Telecommunications Serv-
ices and Equipment.96 The Green Paper represented the Commission's
attempt to balance the Member States' fears of Commission intrusion
into regulatory decisions, the PTTs' concerns about losing their pro-
tected civil service status, and the industry's demand for more access and
fewer restrictions.97 Despite its reluctance to attack the PTTs, the Green
Paper was the primary instrument for subsequent deregulation.
To ensure further support from Member States, the Commission had
to endorse the PTTs, but it attempted to use the Green Paper to establish
the process for future deregulation. The Commission understood that it
could not imitate the strict deregulation in the United States, but could
only hope to accrue enough political concessions from the Member States
to begin the "re-regulation" of Europe.98 Because the PTIs were actu-
ally government agencies, and AT&T had only been a governmentally
endorsed monopoly, the PTTs were more entrenched than AT&T had
ever been.99 In addition, due to the tenuous unification of the European
countries, the Commission held less enforcement power over European
PTTs than the United States Federal Communications Commission (the
91. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
95. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
96. See Green Paper, supra note 12; see also Council Resolution on the Development
of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment up to 1992,
1988 OJ. (C 257) 1 (expressing support for the objectives outlined in the Green Paper).
97. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)49. The Green Paper was based on a deli-
cate balance of divergent interests, as can be seen by contrasting its statement that "the
scope for market forces, competition and innovation must be increased," with its claim
that "the financial viability of the network infrastructure providers [the PTTsJ must be
assured ...." The Green Paper admitted confusion by describing these goals as "two,
partially contradictory, conditions." Id
98. See Austin, supra note 10, at 103-04. The Green Paper discussed its goal of
"start[ing] a common thinking process." See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)19.
99. See supra note 2.
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"FCC") had held over AT&T."
Because they inhibit the free flow of goods, the Green Paper urged the
end of monopolies in the telecommunications market.10 1 As a major
concession, however, it "accept[ed] ... continued exclusive provision or
special rights for the PTfTs regarding provision and operation of the net-
work infrastructure.""1 2 To explain its endorsement of the PTTs, the
Green Paper argued that public service goals, economies of scale, and the
high cost of building parallel networks justified upholding the monopo-
lies. 103 In reality, this provision was intended to assure the PTTs that the
development of a common policy was not at odds with their interests.'°4
The Green Paper called for open competition in all aspects of telecom-
munications except for basic services, which would remain under the
PTTs' monopoly control.'0 5 It admitted that "the trend towards [net-
work] integration has ... led to a blurring of traditional boundaries be-
tween services [and that] [t]here is at present no agreed definition of
'basic services' within the Community."' 1 6 The Green Paper, however,
called for a narrow construction of the definition of basic services to in-
clude only voice telephony. 10 7 Though voice telephony represented 85-
90% of the PTTs' annual revenues in 1987,108 basic services were ex-
pected to grow more slowly than value added services, 109 which were
projected to grow 36% per year."o Thus, even the requirement to der-
egulate non-basic services was very significant. Furthermore, despite its
endorsement of the PTTs' control over basic service, the Green Paper
100. See Austin, supra note 10, at 112.
101. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)10-11. Due to changing technology and
market conditions, the Green Paper stated that the EC had to ensure that "the necessary
European scale and dimension [were] introduced into the current phase of transforma-
tion; [that] no new barriers [were] created within the Community during the adjustment
of regulatory conditions; [and that] existing barriers [were] removed in the course of the
adjustment." Id.
102. Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)72.
103. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)49, 72.
104. See Austin, supra note 10, § (3)103-04. But eventually, the Green Paper's deregu-
latory intent did come in direct conflict with PTT interests.
105. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)14.
106. See Green Paper, supra note 12, at § (3)42. The Green Paper further notes that
"by extension there is, at present, no common definition of 'enhanced' or 'value-added'
services." Id. One analyst has defined basic service to mean "the mere transport of
messages from one place to another with the information remaining unchanged" and
explained that to qualify as enhanced service, the service "must offer additional features
or service attributes." See Wernhard Moschel, Deregulation in Telecommunication Mar-
kets: Theoretical Concepts and Recent Developments in Several Countries, 9 U. New S.
Wales L.J. 79, 91 n.33 (1986).
107. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)14.
108. See Austin, supra note 10, at 105.
109. See id. Value Added Services have been simply defined as "services which are
non-reserved according to the EC services Directive." See John M. Wheeler, Key Issues
in Europe's Open Network Provision: the Case of the German VANS Providers, 1992 Tele-
communications Policy 80, 82.
110. See Austin, supra note 10, at 105.
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called for numerous deregulatory changes in the market."II
Traditionally, the PTTs had done more than just provide telecommu-
nications service. They had also set prices and conditions, and granted
approval for the provision of service and equipment." 12 Even AT&T, at
the height of its power, had never operated with this much control, but
was always subject to FCC regulations. 1 3 The Green Paper demanded
the separation of regulatory and operational activities of the European
PTTs."4 Further, it set as a primary goal the establishment of EC-wide
common technical standards in telecommunications terminals."15 Not-
ing the incompatibility of different Member States' telecommunications
equipment, the Commission created the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute ("ETSI")." 6
In addition, the Green Paper called for open competition in telecom-
munications markets. It sought to eliminate the tie between telecommu-
nications service and the provision of telecommunications equipment "
in an effort to achieve open competition in the terminal market." It
further decided that new services should be completely open to competi-
tion,119 and proposed that even basic telephone services for calls crossing
national borders should be opened to competition. 120
Fearing that PTTs might improperly "cross-subsidize" their new
11. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)14 (including "phased full opening of the
terminal market to competition," "substantial opening of the services market to competi-
tion;" "separation of the regulatory and operational functions of [PTTs]," "partial open-
ing of the market in satellite ground stations to competition, [and] recognition of the fact
that telecommunications tariffs should follow cost trends").
112. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 453-54. For this all-encompassing control, the PMTs
had often been accused of operating as both the 'referee' and the 'player' in the telecom-
munications market. See id. at 454.
113. See Teske, supra note 2, at 2 (mentioning that a 1934 law created the FCC to
ensure continued government regulation of the United States telecommunications
markets).
114. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)185.
115. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)5. The Green Paper called for "the creation
of a Community-wide market for terminals and equipment ... [and] the promotion of
Europe-wide open standards, in order to give equal opportunity to all market participants
116. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)189. ETSI was establish in April, 1988. See
Williamson, supra note 68, at 27.
117. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)14 (calling for open competition in the ter-
minal market). For a description of how PTTs can 'tie' equipment provision to service
provision, see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
118. See Green Paper, supra note 12, at Figure 13 (calling for "[flree (unrestricted)
provision of terminal equipment"). Telecommunications terminals include the basic tele-
phone handset.
119. See id. at Figure 13 (calling for "[flree (unrestricted) provision of all [non-basic]
services ('competitive services', including in particular 'value-added services')"). Services
such as vidoeconferencing are excluded from basic service. See Austin, supra note 10 at
105. For further clarification on the classification of services, see also infra note 106.
120. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)68.
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value-added services,121 and thereby undercut fair competition, the Com-
mission called for a strict accounting system subject to continuous re-
view. 122 It remained unclear, however, who would provide this
continuous review. It would have been problematic for the Member
States to do this review, because they would have been merely policing
themselves.' 23 The Commission itself, however, did not have the man-
power to review all Member State activity. 124 Significantly, the Commis-
sion did not prohibit the PTTs from competing in any new services, 125
unlike the American approach, which prohibited AT&T from competing
in some markets after its break-up.' 26
A major accomplishment of the Green Paper was the establishment of
the Commission's authority to implement the deregulatory goals. Rec-
ommendation "H" stated that the Commission was to provide "strict
and continuous review of operational [commercial] activities of Telecom-
munications Administrations according to Articles 85, 86, and 90 [of the]
EEC Treaty."' 127 Article 90 was most significant because it empowered
the Commission to apply the competition laws of Articles 85 and 86 to
public undertakings, such as the PTTs. 2 More importantly, Article
90(3) allowed the Commission to issue directives implementing these
laws without prior Council approval.' 29 Since the Council consists of
representatives from the Member States, while the Commission is a more
independent body, this provision effectively enabled the Commission to
pass directives without Member State consent.
The Green Paper met with widespread approval. Less than a year af-
ter its initial release, the Commission published a work program on im-
plementation of the Green Paper's recommendations. 30 In June 1988,
the Member States, through the European Council, passed a resolution
accepting the Green Paper's balance between the status quo and
121. See id. § (3)77. The PTTs could simply have raised the price of services over
which they held a monopoly to cover losses suffered in openly competitive markets.
122. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)77-78, 184.
123. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 455. Though the United States does police its own
telecommunications provisions, competition is assured because the FCC does not have an
interest in any one telecommunications provider.
124. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 455.
125. See Green Paper, supra note 12, § (3)178.
126. See Teske, supra note 2, at 5. In a recent development, the United States House
Telecommunications Subcommittee recently passed two bills opening the Regional Bell
Operating Companies to numerous markets from which they had been prohibited since
the AT&T divestiture in 1982. See Mark H. Anderson & Mary Lu Carnevale, Two Tele-
communications Bills Clear House Subcommittee with Rapid Speed, Wall St. J., Mar. 2,
1994, at A3.
127. Green Paper, supra note 12, at Figure 13.
128. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106.
129. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106.
130. Towards a Competitive Community-wide Telecommunications Market in 1992:
Implementing the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Tele-
communications Services and Equipment, COM(88)48.
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deregulation.13 1
B. The Terminal Equipment Directive
The Commission moved quickly to employ its power over the PTTs, as
established by the Green Paper. The Commission's first Green Paper
initiative was the Terminal Equipment Directive. 32 This directive re-
quired PTTs to separate their regulatory bodies from their commercial
distributors. 133 This requirement was primarily responding to the con-
cern that such control discouraged inter- and intra-state competition.
The Terminal Equipment Directive also required Member States to pro-
vide to the Commission, and to publish, a list of all technical specifica-
tions of domestically approved terminal equipment.' 34 This ensured that
producers in other Member States could compete by producing terminal
equipment that met these standards. It also restricted a country's ability
to refuse imports due to standards violations.
This directive required Member States to establish a system of open
competition in the EC's telecommunications terminal equipment mar-
ket. 135 It required the abolition of all special or exclusive rights previ-
ously granted to PTTs to import, sell, and lease terminal equipment, to
market certain services, or to make connections to the public network
and/or maintain terminal equipment. 136 This directive also prohibited
"tying," a process whereby national monopolies would only provide ser-
vice if the user agreed to purchase telecommunications equipment from
the national producer. 3 7 But it did allow a PTT either to ban equipment
that failed to meet the requirements of directives on harmonization of EC
telecommunications equipment, 3 1 or alternatively, to have its own non-
discriminatory technical requirements. 39
Several European countries reacted strongly to the Commission's bold
move. France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and Greece challenged the
Commission's Terminal Equipment Directive in the European Court of
131. See Council, Services and Equipment Directive, supra note 38.
132. Commission Directive 88/301 on Competition on the Markets in Telecommuni-
cations Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73 [hereinafter Terminal Equipment Di-
rective]. This was a risky move by the Commission, since this Directive was passed
before the Council accepted the Green Paper's proposals.
133. See id. at 76, art. 6.
134. See id. at 76, art. 5.
135. Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 132. "Terminal Equipment" is defined
in Article 1 of the Terminal Equipment Directive. See id. at 1, art. 1.
136. See Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 132, at 76, arts. 2-3.
137. See id. at 75 (prohibiting PTTs from abusing grants of "special or exclusive rights
in regard to the terminal equipment market" which may violate the ECC Treaty require-
ment "that competition in the common markets [ ] not [he] distorted").
138. See id. at 76, art. 3 ("Member States may... refuse to allow terminal equipment
to be connected... where such equipment does not... satisfy the essential requirements
laid down in [the Council harmonization directive]"). For a discussion of the EC harmo-
nization directives, see infra note 143 and accompanying text.
139. See Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 132, at 76.
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Justice."4 The challenge did not address the substance of the directive
so much as it challenged the Commission's authority to pass such a di-
rective."' Upholding the Commission's authority to force such deregu-
lation on the PTTs, the Court substantially upheld the validity of the
directive. 142 Thus, the Commission was empowered to effect change in
the European telecommunications establishment.
While the Green Paper and subsequent directives made great strides
towards deregulation, true liberalization of the terminal equipment mar-
ket required the establishment of highly technical standards with which
European companies would comply. For this reason, the Council also
released directives that established standards so that competing telecom-
munications equipment producers could achieve mutual recognition. 4 3
These standardizing directives were useless until the Commission estab-
lished its authority to enforce them, in the same way that the Green Pa-
per could not effect standardization without these directives to delineate
what the European standards were.
C. The Services Directive
The second Commission directive to flow from the Green Paper, the
Directive on Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Serv-
ices, 1" further advanced open competition in telecommunications. 45
140. Case 202/88, France (Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece intervening) v. EC
Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1991).
141. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106. The challenging States objected on four
grounds: "[tihe distortion of procedure, the incompetence of the Commission, the viola-
tion of the principle of proportionality, and the violation of substantial forms. See Naftel,
supra note 2, at 474-478.
142. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106-07. This established the Commission as Eu-
rope's telecommunication deregulator and gave it the power to intrude even on national
economic decisions. See id.; see also Court Rules in Three Telecoms Cases, Reuter Eur.
Report, Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice, however, did overturn Article 7 of the directive, which attempted
to require Member States to ensure that their PTTs give customers the opportunity to
terminate leasing or maintenance contracts in order to enable consumers to obtain sup-
plies or services elsewhere. The European Court of Justice overturned this portion of the
directive because it failed to specify its reference to contracts between monopoly suppliers
and end-users, despite the fact that contracts with non-monopolistic suppliers are beyond
the reaches of the Commission. See Case 202/88, France (Italy, Belgium, Germany and
Greece intervening) v. EC Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1991).
143. There were numerous such directives, beginning with Council Directive 86/361
of July 24, 1986 on the Initial Stage of Mutual Recognition of Type Approval for Tele-
communications Terminal Equipment, 1985, O.J.(L 217) 21, and most recently with
Council Directive 91/263 of April 29, 1991 on the Approximation of the Laws of Mem-
ber States Concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual
Recognition of their Conformity, 1991 O.J.(L 128) 1. For a brief description of the Tele-
communications Terminal Equipment Directive's requirements, see Scherer, supra note
41, at 15-17.
144. See Services Directive, supra note 26, at 10.
145. See id. at 15, art. 2; see generally Beaton, supra note 38, at 691; Constantine J.
Zepos, Liberalizing the "Sacred Cows". Telecommunications and Postal Services in the
EC, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 203, 212.
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Releasing this directive was a daring act by the Commission because it
was done before the Court had even decided on the legitimacy of the
Terminal Equipment Directive. t" The Services Directive addressed the
problem of the PTTs' being both referee and player in the telecommuni-
cations markets147 by requiring a body independent of the telecommuni-
cations organization to control certain licenses, specifications, frequency
allocations, and surveillance of usage conditions.' These provisions re-
sponded to the concern that PTTs suffered from inherent conflicts of in-
terest, and challenged the long-standing tradition that gave the PTTs free
reign in the telecommunications markets.
Calling for open competition in telecommunications services, this di-
rective demanded that Member States "withdraw all special or exclusive
rights for the supply of telecommunications services other than voice te-
lephony" and allow private operators to supply such services., Fur-
thermore, this directive required PTTs to provide private operators the
opportunity to obtain leased-lines for circuit- or packet-switched data
services. 5 ' This provision was intended to allow private companies to
compete in "services designed to improve telecommunications functions,
. . . information services providing access to data bases, remote data-
processing services, message storing and forwarding services, . . . transac-
tion services, . . . [and] teleaction services."' 51 Thus, the PTTs were
forced to allow competitors to enter the market in numerous non-basic
services.
The deregulatory effect of the Services Directive was limited, however.
First, its coverage was limited in that it did not apply to "telex, mobile
radiotelephony, paging and satellite services." '52 Second, it still allowed
Member States to retain monopolies over voice telephony,'53 for which it
has been criticized as being an ineffective instrument of deregulation."
This exception presumed voice telephony to represent analog transmis-
sions, as distinguished from data transmissions, and was intended to al-
low only analog technology to remain under monopoly control.'
Because digital technology is now used even for telephony, however, this
provision allowed PTTs to retain some aspects of digital technology
146. See Austin, supra note 10, at 107.
147. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
148. See Services Directive, supra note 26, at 16, art. 7.
149. Services Directive, supra note 26, at 15, art. 2.
150. See id. at 15-16, arts. 3 & 4. For a discussion of the importance of leased lines, see
infra note 65.
151. Id. at 10-11, para. 6.
152. Id. at 15, art. 1.
153. See iL at 15, art. 2.
154. See W. Scott Blackmer et al., Brussels Takes Another Step Toward Telecommuni-
cations Liberalization, 7 The Computer Law 24 (March 1990) (criticizing the Services
Directive as being "besot with compromise," and not effecting liberalization fast enough);
cf Beaton, supra note 38, at 698-99 (complaining that although the 1991 Standards Di-
rective approach seems simplistic, it belies the difficulty of its implementation).
155. See Services Directive, supra note 26, at 15, art. 2.
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under monopoly control too.156 "[B]y allowing the PTTs to keep control
over private lines for voice and also allowing the PTTs to define the scope
of that control, the Services Directive [ ] reinforced a significant barrier
to the development of competition even in data."' 157
In light of the competing interests involved in the European telecom-
munications market, however, many analysts have conceded that this di-
rective might have failed had it been too aggressive. A difficult balance
had to be struck between speedy liberalization and slowly building a
strong foundation. "A slower pace may [have] yield[ed] a better founda-
tion and structure for the provision of telecommunications products and
services which in the long term may [have] be[en] in the best interest of
the industry and its customers. On the other hand, if the pace [was] too
slow, international telecommunications opportunities may [have] be[en]
lost.", 58
Once again, some Member States disapproved of this implementation
of Commission power without prior Council approval. Spain, Belgium,
and Italy challenged the Services Directive.15 9 As it did in the challenge
to the Terminal Equipment Directive,'I the European Court of Justice
substantially upheld the Commission's authority. 6' In a continued ef-
fort to achieve Member State support, however, the Commission agreed
to pass the Services Directive on the same day the Council passed a
framework directive for Open Network Provision ("ONP Directive"). 62
D. The ONP Directive
As part of the Commission's agreement to strengthen support for the
Services Directive, the Council passed the ONP Directive.' 63 This direc-
tive established its own goals for the industry and empowered its own
156. See Beaton, supra note 38, at 692.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain, Belgium, and Italy v.
Commission (May 20, 1992) (Jacobs, A.G.).
160. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
161. See Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain, Belgium, and Italy v.
Commission (May 20, 1992) (Jacobs, A.G.); see also EC Commission's Monopoly-Busting
Powers Upheld, Reuter Bus. Rep., Nov. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; Suzanne Perry, Article 90 Confirmed as Commission Anti-Monopoly
Weapon, Reuter E.C. Rep., Nov. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File. Similar to the holding in the Terminal Directive, the European Court of Justice
annulled aspects of the directive that might have applied to private contracts, which is
beyond the Commission's authority under the EEC Treaty. See Joined Cases C-271/90,
C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain, Belgium, and Italy v. Commission (May 20, 1992) (Ja-
cobs, A.G.).
162. Council Directive 90/387 on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Tele-
communications Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision, 1990
O.J.(L 192) 1 [hereinafter ONP Directive]. The original ONP Directive is also referred
to as the "Framework Directive" because it established the methodology for future direc-




self-created committees to pass further directives to implement these
goals. The ONP Directive was closely modeled after the American Open
Network Architecture ("ONA"), which was developed by the FCC in
the wake of the AT&T break-up. 1"
In 1982, the Third Circuit disbanded the twenty-two Bell Operating
Companies of AT&T, forming seven Regional Bell Operating Compa-
ies. 65 This decision stifled innovation because each of these companies
worked on developing its own basic telecommunications network instead
of implementing the latest technologies. 66 The FCC therefore estab-
lished the ONA in an attempt to eliminate the shortcomings of structural
separation. 67 By creating "non-structural safeguards" based on the
principle of free access, the FCC hoped to promote technological ad-
vancement while retaining open competition.1 68  Stressing the un-
bundling of services to promote competition, "[the] ONA seemed to
promise the ideal of a totally free market in telecommunications [in
America]: a perfect market in which every service could be broken down
into its constituent parts and priced according to some marginal cost
principle, and in which the benefits of integration could be reconciled
with total competition."'1 69
The EC followed the United States' development of the ONA with
keen interest. Seeing the ONA as a tool that could work equally well in
Europe, the Commission's Senior Officials Group for Telecommunica-
tions established the Groupe Analysis et Prevision (the "GAP"). 70 The
GAP studied the ONA and issued a report supporting a comparable Eu-
ropean entity.17 1 After multiple revisions, the GAP proposal was passed
as the Council's ONP Directive on June 28, 1990.172 This directive was
intended to balance the Member States' concern with the Services
Directive. 173
The ONP Directive purported to attempt "harmoniz[ation of] condi-
tions for open and efficient access to and use of public telecommunica-
tions networks," and to facilitate sufficient access to such networks such
that even the PTTs' competitors could use them freely.' 74 Though the
ONP Directive appeared to promote competition, it actually entrenched
164. See Austin, supra note 10, at 109.
165. See Teske, supra note 2, at 5.
166. See Austin, supra note 10, at 109.
167. See id.
168. See id
169. Id at 109.
170. See id at 109-10.
171. See id at 110.
172. See id at 110.
173. See id
174. ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 1, at 2. The ONP Directive initially aimed to
harmonize the following areas: leased lines, packet-switched and circuit-switched data
services, the Integrated Services Digital Network, and related services such as voice te-
lephony, telex, and access to networks. See id at Annex I, at 1-6; see also Beaton, supra
note 38, at 695-97.
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PTT control and reassured the PTTs of their place in the market. Unlike
the ONA, which had not concerned itself with protecting AT&T, the
GAP proposals stated that the "ONP should not lead to the gradual ero-
sion of the current position of the Telecommunications Administrations
in the overall market place."' 75 Furthermore, the ONP Directive guar-
anteed the PTTs' continued control of basic service by limiting itself
from interfering with "restrictions which may be derived from the exer-
cise of special or exclusive rights granted by Member States and which
are compatible with Community law."' 7 6
Though the ONP Directive was only intended to stimulate develop-
ment of nonreserved telecommunications services, it did attempt to pro-
mote fair competition between PTTs and private service operators. 177
Thus, there were some deregulatory aspects to. the ONP Directive. One
major step towards deregulation was the ONP Directive's requirements
that tariff principles be "clearly laid down to ensure fair and transparent
conditions for all users." '178 Until the ONP Directive, even if the PTTs
were required to provide competitors with access to the hard-wire sys-
tem, they could retain their monopolistic control by imposing arbitrary
tariffs on system usage.
179
The drafters of the ONP Directive envisioned "a kind of pan-Euro-
pean motorway system over which any operator ... could run telecom-
munication services." 180 To implement this vision, the ONP Directive
prohibited tariffs that discriminated against competitors' 8' whom the
PTTs had been over-charging to retain their market control. The ONP
Directive required that PTTs treat service providers equally by setting
transparent tariffs "sufficiently unbundled" so that users knew what they
were paying for.'8 2 Though the Directive expressed a desire for the tar-
iffs to be based on objective criteria and to be "cost-oriented," it accepted
that "the fixing of the actual tariff level will continue to be the province
of national legislation and is not the subject of open network provision
conditions." ' 8
Regarding the promotion of inter-European standardization, the ONP
Directive simply stated that European standards should comply with ex-
isting international standards, such as those set by the European Tele-
communications Standards Institute and the European Conference of
175. See Austin, supra note 10, at 110 (quoting the GAP ONP Report).
176. ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 3, at 4.
177. See Zepos, supra note 145, at 213.
178. ONP Directive, supra note 162, at 1.
179. See Austin, supra note 10, at 111; Beaton, supra note 38, at 692 ("[T]he separa-
tion of regulation from operations, although recognized as a step in the right direction,
cannot by itself safeguard against PTrs' unwarranted control as long as the PTTs can
impose tariff restrictions on the purpose for which circuits are used.").
180. Higham, supra note 58, at 242.





Postal and Telecommunications Administrations ("CEPT"). ' Further,
it stated that ETSI was to develop standards for new telecommunications
technologies."'5 The ONP Directive clearly prioritized standardization
as part of its objective to promote the creation of pan-European
networks.18 6
The ONP Directive also promoted open competition by requiring the
PTTs to set reasonable and transparent usage conditions.I" It required
that the conditions for access to services offered by telecommunications
administrations in the Member States be based on objective criteria, be
published, and be understandable. s1 8  This directive also required Mem-
ber States to guarantee equality of access and act nondiscriminatorily
within the parameters of Community law.' Further, it prohibited re-
stricted access to public telecommunications networks and/or public
services "except for reasons based on essential requirements, within the
framework of Community law."' '90
To enforce the goals it set forth, the ONP Directive contained a provi-
sion for the establishment of an "advisory" committee composed of rep-
resentatives of the Member States and chaired by a representative of the
Commission.' 91 The ONP Committee's primary task was to consult with
184. See iL at 7. These were both standardization administrations which had been
created by other European initiatives. See supra Ungerer, supra note 35, at Box 23 (for a
brief history of CEPT); note 116 and accompanying text (discussing ETSI).
185. See ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 4, at 4. Interestingly, ETSI may have
gone too far in its fulfillment of this delegation. Recently, there have been charges that
the ETSI is abusing its power. AT&T is presently challenging ETSI requirements that
may infringe on technical copyrights of companies that compete in the European market.
See Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, Complaint and Re-
quest for Interim Measures against European Telecommunications Standards Institute
submitted to the Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General for
Competition (June 23, 1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
186. See ONP Directive, supra note 162, at 2 (listing as "one of [its] principal aims[,]
... the creation of conditions to promote the development of Europe-wide services").
187. See ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 3, at 3 (requiring conditions for network
access to be "based on objective criteria, .... transparent and published in an appropriate
manner," and in accordance with EC law such that they "guarantee equality of access");
see also Austin, supra note 10, at 111.
188. See ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 3, at 3.
189. See id
190. Id at art. 3, at 4. The Directive limited such essential requirements to "security
of network operations," "maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of serv-
ices," and "protection of data." Id Note that "[plromoting competition while protect-
ing society is the long standing charge of telecommunications regulation." See Beaton,
supra note 38, at 697. This ideal was discussed in
the 1986 landmark Carterfone case before the United States Federal Communi-
cations Commission where AT&T unsuccessfully argued that allowing non-
AT&T terminal equipment to interconnect with the network would harm the
integrity of the network. Although it is generally conceded that AT&T's posi-
tion in that particular case was untenable, the issues of who, where, and how
the network is accessed still raises significant concerns in terms of national se-
curity and network integrity.
Id at 697 n.54.
191. See ONP Directive, supra note 162, art. 9, at 5 ("The Commission shall be as-
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users, consumers, manufacturers, and service providers, and thus apply
the ONP principles to the four key areas of the telecommunications sec-
tor:9 ' Integrated Services Digital Network ("Digital Network"), 93
Packet Switched Data Services,' 94 leased lines, 9 ' and voice telephony. 96
Though the ONP Directive eased the Member States' concern over the
Services Directive, it may have actually strengthened the Commission's
control over telecommunications by entangling it in a process of Europe-
wide regulation.' 97 Using the established legislation, the Commission
and Council have recently released numerous deregulatory proposals
under the auspices of the ONP Directive in such areas as Packet
Switched Data,' 98 leased lines, 199 and Digital Network.2" Significantly,
the Council has proposed application of the ONP Directive to voice te-
lephony,20' which would signify the end of the PTTs' guaranteed market
control. The EC's most recent proposal has been for an ONP Directive
sisted by a committee of a [sic] advisory nature.... ."); see also Commission Decision 90/
450 Setting up a Joint Committee on Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J.(L 230) 25
(which actually created the aforementioned committee).
192. The ONP Directive actually applied to eight telecommunications areas, see ONP
Directive, supra note 162, Annex I, at 6, but these four were the most significant. See
Austin, supra note 10, at 112.
193. See supra note 46.
194. Packet Switched Data Network is a relatively new type of telecommunications
network that transmits data in bursts ('packets'). By routing the data so as to access free
network capacity, this type of transmission is very efficient, and thus cheaper than regular
networks. For a brief discussion of the development of Packet Switched Data technol-
ogy, see Ungerer, supra note 35, at 114 (Box 18); see also supra note 61 (discussing how
Packet Switch Data tachnology advances created a threat to the PTTs' market control).
195. See supra note 65.
196. See supra note 26 (defining telephony).
197. See Austin, supra note 10, at 108-09.
198. See Council Recommendation 92/382 of 5 June 1992 on the Harmonization pro-
vision of a Minimum set of Packet-Switched Data Services in accordance with Open
Network Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J. (L 200). The Council was not prepared
to release mandatory requirements for this technology due to wide divergences within the
EC in the availability of more advanced data and digital services. For that reason, this is
merely a 'recommendation,' and thus is not binding on Member States. See Higham,
supra note 58, at 244.
199. See Council Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1992 on the Application of Open Network
Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165). This directive was essential for many new
entrants who could not provide their own fixed networks. See Higham, supra note 58, at
243-44.
200. See Council Recommendation 92/388 of 5 June 1992 on the Provision of Harmo-
nized Integrated Services Digital Network Access Arrangements and a Minimum Set of
Integrated Services Digital Network Offerings in Accordance with Open Network Provi-
sion (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J.(L 200).
201. See Commission Revised Proposal for a Council Directive on the Applications of
Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony, COM(92)247 final and Commis-
sion Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Application to Open Network
Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony COM(93)82 final. The goals of these proposals are
"to establish the rights of users to voice services [and] to improve access to the [public
switched networks] for all users." Higham, supra note 58, at 244. See id. for a brief
description of the provisions called for in this proposed directive.
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on mobile (cellular) services.2 "2
E. The Guidelines
The Commission understood that the interests of "full interconnectiv-
ity" through standardization often require PTTs to enter agreements that
conflict with the requirements of open competition. In an attempt to
clarify which agreements between PTTs are acceptable under EC compe-
tition rules and which type of agreements are prohibited, the Commis-
sion released Guidelines for the PTTs.' 3 Though these Guidelines did
not create enforceable rights, they were based on an analysis of European
Court holdings and did indicate how the European Court of Justice (the
"ECJ") would enforce competition laws in the telecommunications sec-
tor.2" The Guidelines attempted to balance the EC goal of promoting
competition between PTTs with the reality that sometimes technological
advances and further standardization require agreements between PTTs.
In some ways, the Guidelines reinforced the PTTs' control by tacitly
accepting the notion that only PTTs provide telecommunications facili-
ties. The Guidelines themselves claimed to "govern the way [PTTs] can
provide those facilities to the service providers" which "must" access
them.2"5 This represented "a bias towards the status quo and a failure to
recognize the full opportunity for competition in the telecommunications
industry. '20 6 But the Guidelines did achieve some measure of deregula-
tion. They listed the types of agreements which will be subject to scru-
tiny to help companies avoid violating antitrust laws.207 Thus, the
Guidelines clearly established that some types of anti-competitive activ-
ity are considered "undesirable collusion,"208 and, as such, are subject to
202. See Higham, supra note 58, at 245-46.
203. Commission Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the
Telecommunications Sector, 1991 O.J. (C 233) 2 [hereinafter Guidelines].
204. Guidelines, supra note 203, at 4. The Guidelines were based on the Green Paper's
establishment that PTTs are subject to the full range of the EC's competition rules ac-
cording to the EEC Treaty, Articles 85 and 86. See Foslom, supra note 38, at 692 n.40.
They called for a continuous review of telecommunications administrators. See Guide-
lines, supra note 203, at 2; see generally Richard Wiley et al., Telecommunications Policy
and Regulation 1991: The Year Ahead, Congress, The FCC and Judge Greene's Court, in
International Overview (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 599, 1991), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File; Robin-
son, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing the Commission's adoption of Directorate General
IV's Guidelines for competition rules on July 26, 1991).
205. Beaton, supra note 38, at 694.
206. Id.
207. See Guidelines, supra note 203, at 10-16. The Guidelines use the following gen-
eral categories for suspect PTT activity: "horizontal agreements concerning the provi-
sion of terrestrial facilities and reserved services," ".agreements concerning the provision
of non-reserved services and terminal equipment," and "agreements on research and de-
velopment." Id The Guidelines further state that a PTT is in violation if "(i) the under-
taking concerned holds an individual or joint dominant position; (ii) it commits an abuse
of that dominant position; and (iii) the abuse may affect trade between Member States."
Id




The Commission has entrenched itself in the European telecommuni-
cations markets as the primary regulator of the PTTs. Beginning with
the Green Paper, and continuing through subsequent directives, the
Commission has forced tremendous reforms on the monopoly operators.
The Council has assisted the deregulatory process by supporting Com-
mission efforts and by passing its own legislation to govern the PTTs,
most significantly, the ONP Directive.210 Bolstered by ECJ endorsement
and Council reinforcement, the Commission has successfully opened
many telecommunications markets to competition and it will continue to
do the same in other telecommunications markets.
III. HURDLES IN THE ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THE DEREGULATORY
GOALS OF THE GREEN PAPER
The Commission faced numerous hurdles in enforcing the Green Pa-
per's deregulating goals. European countries did not want the EC Com-
mission to control their economic decisions.21I Therefore, some
countries challenged Commission directives even when they approved of
the directives' goals.2 2 Though the ECJ substantially upheld the Com-
mission's legislative authority, these challenges, which represented a lack
of support for the Commission, slowed the deregulatory process. 21 3
In addition, many countries disapproved of the theories behind the
deregulating efforts. The more technologically advanced countries had
already provided basic service to their residents and wished to further
develop their value-added services. Some of these advanced countries
believed that enhanced services could best be developed by strong gov-
ernment involvement. The most extreme example of this attitude existed
in France, where the government pioneered the Minitel to provide a two-
way text-link in three million homes.2" 4
209. See id. at 4 ("[t]he Commission will apply these principles"); see also Beaton,
supra note 38, at 693 (explaining that the Guidelines clarify how the Commission intends
to enforce competition rules in the telecommunications sector).
210. See supra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
211. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106-07.
212. See Case 202/88, France (Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece intervening) v.
EC Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1991) (in which France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and
Greece challenged the Commission's Terminal Equipment Directive); Joined Cases C-
271/90, C-281/90, C-289-90, Spain, Belgium, and Italy v. Commission (May 20, 1992)
(in which Spain, Belgium, and Italy challenged the Services Directive); see also supra
notes 140-42, 159, 161 and accompanying text. In both cases, the challenge did not
battle the substance of the directive as much as it challenged the Commission's authority
to pass such a directive.
213. See Austin, supra note 10, at 106-07 (discussing how the challenge to the Termi-
nal Equipment Directive slowed its implementation by three years); Hilary Clarke, Sur-
vey of International Telecommunications, Financial Times, Oct. 15, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (describing that private sector investors were hesi-
tant to enter the markets while the cases were pending).
214. See Ungerer, supra note 35, at 56-57 (Box 7); The New Boys, supra note 2; see also
infra note 267 and accompanying text.
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Most of the developed countries, however, agreed that open competi-
tion was the best way to achieve greater enhanced services. But many
lesser developed countries, which were more concerned with supplying
basic service to their residents, believed that a national monopoly would
best accomplish this goal. These countries feared that if they allowed
open competition, most companies would focus their energies on the
more profitable enterprise of enhancing service on the existing hard-wire
lines. By neglecting the less profitable laying of more wires, these compa-
nies would be leaving some residents with no service at all.215
Other complications restricted the Commission's efforts. Europe was
replete with unknown telecommunications needs among Member States
and evolving international and national laws and policies.216 In addition,
the absence of a single authority meant that the regulatory process was
highly susceptible to Europe's volatile political climate.2t7
The delayed progress of the Maastricht Treaty"1 8 and the limited ap-
plication of the Uruguay round of the GATT talks219 have exposed a
lack of European unity. Furthermore, the multiplicity of agreements
that continually redefine the balance of power, such as the International
Telecommunications Union,220 the International Consultative Commit-
tees, the International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Commit-
tee,221 and the International Radio Consultative Committee, have made
market definition and competitive positions difficult to predict or to
quantify.222 In addition, explosive developments in telecommunication
technology sometimes wreak havoc with traditional notions of telecom-
215. See e.g., Constantelou, supra note 8, at 437 ("It can be argued that the EC's
initial approach to creating a pan-European policy framework did not fully consider the
different circumstances and the particular problems some less-developed regions face
216. See Beaton, supra note 38, at 690.
217. See Austin, supra note 10, at 115.
218. Even though Germany's recent approval finally completed the Maastricht
Treaty's ratification process, see Oster, supra note 19 (referring to the "newly ratified
Maastricht Treaty"), it failed to meet expectations. See Hobart Rowen, Germany: High-
Tech Laggard, Wash. Post, July 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File ("The high hopes for European political and social unity under the Maastricht
Treaty are all but forgotten."); see also George B. Hefferan, III & Joanne Katsantonis,
Movement Towards an Internal Market in 1993: An Overview of Current Legal Develop-
ments in the European Community, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1, 5-7; Editorial, Bumps
on the Road to European Utopia, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
219. See Marcellus S. Snow, Trade in Information Services in Asia, ASEAN, and the
Pacific: Conceptual Issues and Policy Examples, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 329, 340 (1992);
International Trade, US. Official Criticizes EC Position in GATT Talks, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWVS File (despite hopes to
harmonize telecommunications regulation through the GATT process, it was recently
removed from the GATT agenda). See generally Beaton, supra note 38, at 701-02.
220. See id at 336; see generally Ungerer, supra note 35, at 101-03.
221. See Adriane C. M. Nugter & Jan M. Smits, The Regulation of International Tele-
communication Services: A New Approach, 14 N.C.J. Intl. L. & Com. Reg. 191, 197 n.29
(1989).
222. See Beaton, supra note 38, at 690.
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munications and monopoly-based services.22 3
Another complication arose from the European interest in standardi-
zation. 24 When attempting to standardize telecommunications, it is eas-
ier to deal with only one provider from each nation than to attempt
agreement between multiple operators from each country. This is one
reason that the Commission endorsed continued PTT operation in all but
its most recent legislative efforts.2 25
The enormous power held by the PTTs was another reason the Com-
mission was forced to endorse PTT control.2 26 The governments of the
Member States were reluctant to forgo the profits obtained through con-
trol of a telecommunications monopoly. 2 1 Presumably, their sub-con-
tractors also favored the status quo out of a fear that any industry
changes would cost them work. Even labor groups favored PTT opera-
tion because telecommunications workers were loath to relinquish the
benefits of being civil servants .2 2  Finally, European anti-monopoly ef-
forts have been complicated by the reality that individual nations have
reacted differently to deregulating legislation. 29
223. Id. A good example of this was described earlier in the discussion of how ad-
vances in optic fibre and packet switching technology allowed the cable network to com-
pete with the PTTs. See supra note 61.
224. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
225. The interest in standardization may have severely restricted international compe-
tition. Some non-EC countries fear that the EC will use the intense standardization re-
quirements of establishing a digital network as a weapon to create trade barriers. See
Snow, supra note 219, at 340.
226. Cf Beaton, supra note 38, at 690 (opining that the PTTs themselves have slowed
the deregulation process).
227. Analysts have estimated that telecommunications will account for approximately
6% of the EC's GDP by the year 2000, so it is not surprising that those who control these
"cash cows" are reluctant to give them up. See Clarke, supra note 213; see, e.g., Con-
stantelou, supra note 8, at 437 (describing the Greek government's view of its PTT as a
"cash flow machine").
228. See Andrew Adonis, Survey of International Telecommunications, Fin. Times,
Oct. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (mentioning the
problems arising from "guarantees of employee rights"); see, e.g., Ariane Genillard,
Deutsche Telekom Hangs on for Sell-Off Call The German Group's Privatization Faces
Political Hurdles, Fin. Times, Oct. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (describing the barrier to German privatization because the Trade Union
fears that telecommunications employees may lose their "privileged status of German
civil servants").
229. Cf Williamson, supra note 68 (mentioning the complications that result from
"[t]he fact that the scope of deregulation and competitive opportunity continues to differ
from country to country across [Europe]").
Many countries have utilized three stages in their deregulation process. In the first
stage, the State ran the PTTs, and all decisions were made by government ministers.
Increasingly, countries granted their PTT corporate status and gave it operational inde-
pendence. During this second stage, the state served as a major, or complete, share-
holder, and government ministers still appointed the board members. Finally, in the
third stage, some countries fully privatized their PTTs and removed all government in-
volvement.
Within two years, according to one estimate, only Austria, Norway, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland will remain at the first stage of the development process. Those countries at
the second stage include, or will soon include, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, and
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Despite all of these complications, the Commission has been substan-
tially successful in enforcing its directives and in integrating market de-
regulation. According to the latest Commission Report, only Belgium
and Spain have failed to apply the Terminal Equipment Directive prop-
erly, and only Greece has yet to satisfactorily implement the Services
Directive.230 In addition, only Greece and Italy have not succeeded in
adopting the policies espoused in the ONP Directive.3
To appreciate truly the deregulation progress, it is necessary to analyze
the changes that have been implemented in individual European nations.
This analysis examines the PTTs in individual European countries,
grouped by their level of economic development. This Note discusses
each country's separation of telecommunications regulatory control from
its national service provider. Also discussed are national movements to-
ward open competition in the telecommunication terminals market, and
similar movements toward open competition in the telecommunications
services market.232
A. The Most Developed Countries
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom ("UK") serves as the model for European tele-
communications deregulation. The deregulation process began in 1984,
when the Thatcher Government passed the Telecommunications Act,2 33
which privatized British Telecommunications ("BT"), the UK's PTT,-
and established the government's intent to "dissolve" BT's monopoly.,?
The government then created a duopoly in the telecommunications mar-
ket and, from 1984 to 1990, allowed Mercury Communications to com-
pete with BT.236
Sweden, the first four of which will soon move towards the third stage-complete priva-
tization. The other European countries have already reached the third stage by fully
privatizing their PTTs. See Adonis, supra note 228.
230. Commission Tenth Annual Report on the Monitoring of the Application of Com-
munity Law, COM(93)320 final at 40-42, 332,369.
231. Id. at 40, 369.
232. This section does not discuss any of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden), since the EFTA countries declined entrance into the EC. How-
ever, since these countries have now joined the EU, they are now subject to EC telecom-
munications deregulation law. See supra note 4. Therefore, for a brief analysis of the
level of deregulation in these countries, see Jurgen Muller et al., Telecommunications
Liberalization in the Nordic Countries, 1993 Telecommunications Policy 623 (1993).
233. See Peter Strivens & Vicki Sinden, Telecommunications Law in the United King-
dom, in Telecommunications Laws in Europe 129, 129-30 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993)
(discussing the Telecommunications Act of 1984).
234. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 452; The New Boys, supra note 2. Originally, the
government retained 49% control, but it gradually sold its shares until 1993, when the
government sold its last shares and BT became completely privatized. See Adonis, supra
note 228.
235. See Strivens & Sinden, supra note 233, at 129-30 (discussing the Broadcasting Act
of 1990).
236. When BT purchased Mitel of Canada, the Mergers & Monopolies Commission
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In 1990, a six-month review of the duopoly market culminated in a
white paper that called for free and unfettered competition in all facets of
telecommunications.237 Since that time, the government's Department of
Trade & Industry, acting in collaboration with an independent regula-
tory body known as OFTEL, has regulated the market and endorsed
open competition in all British telecommunications markets.238 In subse-
quent licensing decisions, the UK established a trend towards relatively
unrestricted competition between the network and private providers.239
Without additional primary legislation, the UK succeeded in substan-
tially subjecting telecommunications to open competition.240
The UK's deregulation is evident in all of its telecommunications mar-
kets. Provision of leased lines has grown from three networks to over 700
lines, provided by nearly 120 firms. 24 1 The government has licensed pri-
vate providers of mobile radio, paging, cable television, and value-added
242ThUK anetwork services. The UK has also endorsed open competition in the
terminal equipment market. Though the 1984 Act required terminal
equipment providers to obtain operation licenses to ensure compliance
with technical standards, it clearly encouraged competition.243 Since
that time, the licensing process has been well-organized, and it has even
been legal to sell unlicensed, non-standard equipment. 2 "4
Despite these advances, some analysts point out the difficulties that
result from such an unregulated environment, such as the need for in-
creased government supervision.245 In addition, some still claim that,
despite appearances, the UK is not truly deregulated.246 One recent re-
port claimed that a long distance call from the UK to the United States
intervened, to prevent wiping Mercury out of market, and limited the total number of
PBX's that BT could sell in the UK. See generally The Monopolies and Mergers Com-
mission, British Telecommunications PLC and Mitel Corporation: A Report on the Pro-
posed Merger (1986); Crossed Lines for BT and Mitel, The Economist, Feb. 1, 1986,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
237. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 452.
238. See Strivens & Sinden, supra note 233, at 129.
239. See id. at 129.
240. Britain has, at most, required a new provider to obtain a license as provided in the
Telecommunications Act of 1984. See id. at 130-31.
241. See Moschel, supra note 106, at 91.
242. See Morris, supra note 43, at 89. The UK's Department of Trade & Industry
chose to allow Self-Provision Licenses for private land networks and Satellite Class
Licenses for private satellite networks. This permits companies to set up private telecom-
munications systems without relying on either BT's or another major provider's network.
See generally Strivens & Sinden, supra note 233, at 138-39.
243. See Strivens & Sinden, supra note 233, at 130.
244. See id. at 130-31.
245. See, e.g., The New Boys, supra note 2 (describing the large amount of monitoring
facing Britain's telecommunications reformers).
246. See Scott Gibson & Saul Goldstein, The Plane Truth: How European Deals are
Killing U.S. Jobs, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (claiming that "if British long-distance lines were open to international
competition, U.S. firms would do well. It costs British TELECOM more to place your
call than it costs AT&T, MCI, or Sprint.").
2188 [Vol. 62
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREG ULA TION
costs five times as much as it should.247 Most legislators, however, are
satisfied with the level of telecommunications technology in the UK and
envision such achievements across Europe.248
In contrast, despite one analyst's claim that Ireland has one of Eu-
rope's most modem telecommunications systems, 249 Ireland has been
granted an extended deadline for telecommunications deregulation.
Telecom Eireann is a State-owned company that controls Irish telecom-
munications and is subject to intense governmental control.25° In an at-
tempt to optimize the network potential, Telecom Eireann is considering
an alliance with the British telecommunications provider, Cable and
Wireless. Such an alliance would eventually lead towards privatization
and deregulation.
2. France
France exemplifies the technologically advanced country that desires
high quality telecommunications but believes that government regulation
is a valid means to attain that goal. Recently, however, France has ef-
fected some deregulation to comply with Commission directive. French
telecommunications laws are governed by the Code des Postes et Teld-
communications (the "Code"), which integrates legislative and regula-
tory acts relating to the market.25' In May 1989, French law separated
the telecommunication regulation authority from the entrepreneurial
body of its PTT, France Tdlecom 252 Since that time, the Code has incor-
porated many deregulatory laws in the telecommunications market to
comply with EC requirements.25
France Tdldcom has two principal areas of responsibility: network and
services provision, and entrepreneurial activities (e.g., providing cus-
247. See Hugo Dixon, Telephone Users Over-charged by World Cartel Operation, Fin.
Times, Apr. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (claiming that a
call from the UK to the United States costs five times as much as a long distance call
within the UK, even though it should cost the same amount).
248. Cf. Naftel, supra note 2, at 452-53 (using the UK as the exemplifications of priva-
tization efforts in Europe); Panorama, supra note 64, at 25-18 (listing the UK as the only
exception to the Europe-wide trend that telecommunications services are still mainly con-
trolled by the PTTs).
249. See William Flannery, A Wee Bit of Prospecting Irish Minister Uses Visit to Look
for Investors, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File. The Irish telecommunications market is valued at over 5364 million,
with a projected average annual growth of 10% over the next three years. According to
Seamus Brennun, Ireland's Minister for Commerce and Technology, "[Ireland] has in-
vested extremely heavily in telecommunications," and has a telecommunications system
second only to France. See id.
250. See Ungerer, supra note 35, at 27.
251. See Monique Nion & Franqois Bloch, Telecommunications Law in France, in
Telecommunications Laws in Europe 51, 51 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993).
252. See Nion & Bloch, supra note 251, at 51 (discussing the Direction de la Rigle-
mentation Gindrale des Postes et Teldcommunications).
253. See id at 52-57 (discussing the Code's deregulatory requirements in the markets




tomer premises equipment and advanced services).254 France has moved
quickly to open competition in its terminals market. At the same time, it
has also attempted to regulate the standards of the manufactured termi-
nals by introducing the Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Direc-
tive255 into national law, even before the November 1992 deadline. 256
Therefore, though the French Code allows open competition in the ter-
minal equipment supply market,257 there are strict approval require-
ments before competitors can use, sell, or connect their terminals to the
network.258
France Tdldcom retains a strong monopoly in many areas, and has
made only minimal allowances of open competition to comply with EC
directives. For example, France Tdldcom holds a monopoly over the
public switched network, though the Minister of Telecommunications
may grant a license to other users when it does not interfere with the
PTT's monopoly. 259 In addition, both telephone and telex services can
only be provided by France Tdlicom.2 ° The enhanced service provision
market is an exception to France's strict regulation of its telecommunica-
tions markets. Though such providers must be licensed by the Telecom-
munications Minister, such licenses are given freely, and that market has
been fully open to competition since January 1993.261
In 1991, public law privatized France Tdldcom.262 But despite some
signs of liberalization,263 France has tried to deregulate as little as it can
under EC law. 2" One author, discussing the recent French Privatization
Program, noted that "[u]nlike Thatcher's move, the French plan will
leave untouched the country's- state-run ... telecommunications services,
considered among the most advanced in Europe. '265
In contrast with the UK's leaps toward competition, France improved
its once primitive telecommunications system by intense government in-
254. See Ungerer, supra note 35, at 27.
255. Council Directive 91/263, supra note 143.
256. See Nion & Bloch, supra note 251, at 56.
257. See id.
258. Violators of these laws can suffer FF 1,300 to FF 3,000 in fines and seizure of the
equipment. See id. at 57. For a description of the conformity requirements, see id. at 56-
57.
259. See id. at 51-52.
260. See id. at 55.
261. See id.
262. The privatization transformed France Teldcom from a public administration into
an institution. See Rudolf Pospischil, Reorganization of European telecommunications,
1993 Telecommunications Policy 603, 605.
263. For example, France Tdldcom, which had held a monopoly over cordless telecom-
munications, has recently allowed Bouygues to enter market. See France: Bouygues May
Enter Mobile Telephone sector, Le Figaro, Sept. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CURNWS File.
264. See Nion & Bloch, supra note 251, at 59.
265. William Drozdiak, France to Sell Its Control of 21 Key Firms, Wash. Post, May
27, 1993, available in WESTLAW, PAPERSMJ File.
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volvement. 266 The French PTT also created telecommunications termi-
nals, called Minitels, available at little or no cost, and has played an
active role in administering the network.267 Therefore, developments in
France constitute a strong argument against the claim that open compe-
tition is necessary to develop advanced technology.268
Some critics have pointed out that France's intense governmental in-
volvement has weakened its position in some telecommunications mar-
kets.269 Critics of the French methodology claim that state control has
resulted in the development of fewer services, which will result in less
business in the long run.270 In sum, although substantially complying
with EC directives to avoid retribution for violations, France has deregu-
lated as little as possible.27'
3. Germany
Germany was a long-time traditionalist, relying on government-owned
monopoly providers for telecommunications services. 2 72 Until 1988, tele-
communications was a government responsibility.273 The Deutsche
Bundespost, which was headed by the Federal Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications ("MPT"), acted as Germany's PTT and was not subject
to any regulatory body.274 Beginning in 1985, however, the German gov-
ernment established a commission of politicians, academics, and others
(including labor, producer, and consumer representatives) 2 5 to "de-
velop[ ] proposals for the reform of the telecommunications sector.' 27 6
266. See Morris, supra note 43, at 89-90.
267. A Minitel terminal is a specialized terminal equipped with screen and keyboard.
The French government originally provided them at no cost, in place of paper telephone
directories, thus allowing the public to become acquainted with the system very quickly.
For a brief description of the Minitel, see Ungerer, supra note 35, at 56, Box 7.
268. See Morris, supra note 43, at 89-90.
269. See The New Boys, supra note 2 (claiming that excessive government involvement
in cellular and fax technologies may have weakened France's competitive position
internationally).
270. Some critics claim that the French PTT "has been slow to exploit its potential as
an operator of both telephone and cable networks." Peter Gumbel, France Steers To-
wards 'Superhighway' With TV-Industry Mergers, a New Law, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1994,
at A9.
271. See Nion & Bloch, supra note 251, at 59.
272. See Moschel, supra note 106, at 96. In fact, Germany even tried to extend its
monopolistic control over cordless telephones and modems but was forced by the Com-
mission to abandon these attempts. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 470; see also Morris,
supra note 43, at 95 n.71 (discussing the Cordless Telephone decision).
273. See Joachim Scherer, Telecommunications Law in Germany, in Telecommunica-
tions Laws in Europe 61, 63 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993) (describing how the 1989 reform
"replaced the formerly sweeping monopoly rights of the German Federal Post Office").
274. See Morris, supra note 43, at 94 (explaining that the German dogma had been
such that no additional direct regulation was necessary, since public enterprises under
direct political control are part of the government themselves).
275. See Moschel, supra note 106, at 97.
276. See id at 100. The Commission's report formed the basis of the law eventually
enacted in 1989. See Morris, supra note 43, at 96 n.76.
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Finally, in 1989, German legislators passed the Postal Constitution
Act (the "Act"), which required structural and regulatory changes in the
telecommunications market.277 The Act separated regulatory responsi-
bility from the Deutche Bundespost and gave it to the MPT.278 It also
separated telecommunication from postal operation, and vested telecom-
munications enterprises in DBP Telekom.279
The Act has completely opened terminal equipment to competition.280
Providers need now only show that the new equipment will not harm any
person or DBP Telekom's transmission lines.28' In addition, the equip-
ment is subject to type-approval by the Federal Office for Telecommuni-
cations Approvals to ensure compliance with standardization
requirements.28 2
Despite the new law, DBP Telekom still holds some monopolies in
telecommunications services, such as a limited network monopoly (re-
stricting the right to set up and operate telecommunications transmission
lines and their associated networks) 28 3 and a radio monopoly. 284 While
the Act also permits DBP Telekom to continue its monopoly over the
provision of voice telephony, the Act opens all other services to competi-
tion without requiring governmental licensing.285
Though the Act has advanced deregulatory efforts, some users com-
plain that German telecommunications laws fail to clearly establish what
activities are permitted, complicating the operation of private providers
who do not wish to violate any laws.286 Furthermore, DBP Telekom has
yet to be privatized, and remains a public administration.287 Many forces
within Germany are pushing towards privatization 288 and the German
277. See Joachim Scherer, Telecommunications Law in Germany, in Telecommunica-
tions Laws in Europe 61, 61 & n.1 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993). The Act's provisions are
analyzed in some detail in Morris, supra note 43, at 96-117.
278. See Morris, supra note 43, at 96-97, 101-02.
279. See id. at 96-97.
280. See Morris, supra note 43, at 125.
281. See Scherer, supra note 277, at 125.
282. See id. at 72-73.
283. See id. at 65-66 ("Transmission lines are cable and radio communications installa-
tions together with their transmission equipment [which can] establish point-to-point or
point-to-multipoint connections.").
284. See id. at 66-67. This gives the German government the exclusive right to set up
and operate radio installations. See id.
285. See id. at 72.
286. See Schrage, supra note 79 (Confusion arises if an American company "[w]ant[s]
to install a telecommunications switch using [Digital Network technology in its] local
branch [in Germany] .... There's even some uncertainty over whether it's technically
legal to plug a U.S.-made laptop into the telephone lines without Bundespost approval.");
see also Laurent Belsie, European Phone Fight on Hold, The Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug.
10, 1993, available in WESTLAW, NEWSPAPERS File (illustrating difficulties users
have encountered under the new laws).
287. Rudolf Pospischil, Reorganization of European Telecommunications, 1993 Tele-
communications Policy 603, 605.
288. See Ariane Genillard, Deutsche Telekom Hangs on for Sell-Off Call, Fin. Times,
Oct. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (discussing how even
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Parliament is finally introducing the necessary constitutional amend-
ments to privatize the German PTT,2 89 but the move has been delayed by
political debate.290 In addition, some say that delays in Germany's
movements towards deregulation are justified due to Germany's preoccu-
pation with modernizing telecommunications provision in East
Germany.29'
4. Italy
Italy is the least developed of the countries in this category and is also
disadvantaged by its unusual system of telecommunications provision.
The Ministry for Post and Telecommunications has remained responsible
for national telecommunications, controlling the State Agency for Tele-
phone Services ("ASST"), a public body that provides some basic serv-
ices. 2 92 The ASST, in turn, licenses out the rights to provide the
remaining services to three other companies: SIP, ITALCABLE, and
TELESPAZIO.2 9a In reality, however, the state owns all of these com-
panies through public financial entities.294
Despite minor legislative changes in 1984,295 the still-in-force 1973
Postal and Telecommunications Code296 subjected all telecommunica-
tions markets to control by a public monopoly. Recently, however, the
Italian Parliament began to implement legislation to reform the Italian
telecommunications system. 29 7 As envisioned in the 1992 law, Italy soon
hopes to bring all the telecommunications licensees together to form a
single company, provisionally named Telecom Italia.2 98
the chief executive of the German PTT considers privatization inevitable, and wants to
get the 'trauma' over with and hopes that privatization will bring more capital, make it
easier to forge international alliances, and make it easier to implement cost-cutting
measures).
289. See Adonis, supra note 228.
290. See Genillard, supra note 288. The government agreed to create a holding com-
pany, in which it will hold a majority stake, until it can effect privatization of the German
PTT. But disagreements over the holding company's managerial control has delayed the
privatization process. See IL
291. See Europe Anxious About Information Superhighway, Chi. Trib., Nov. 8, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, PAPERS File (describing how Germany's "efforts to push
through privatization plans and the need for massive financing to upgrade antiquated
East German phone networks are occupying much of its attention"); see also Howard
Rowen, Germany: High-Tech Laggard, Wash. Post, July 8, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, PAPERS File (mentioning Bonn's recent decision to spend sixty five billion
dollars on raising the quality of life in East Germany).
292. See G. Franco Macconi & Raffaele Giarda, Telecommunications Law in Italy, in
Telecommunications Laws in Europe 83, 83 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993).
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See idL (discussing Presidential Decree No. 523 of Aug. 13, 1984).
296. See id. (discussing the Codice Postale e delle Telecomunicazioni, enacted by Presi-
dential Decree DPR No. 156 of 29 March, 1973).
297. See id (discussing Law No. 58 of Jan. 29, 1992, on the reorganization of the
telecommunications sector).
298. See Adonis, supra note 228; Italy: Stet-Telecom Italia Project Conforms to EC
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Italy has substantially succeeded in opening its terminal equipment
market to competition. But this seems to be the only area in which Italy
has complied with EC policy.29 9 Italy has largely failed to open telecom-
munications services to competition. Basic, and even enhanced, services
are still controlled by a state monopoly. Only newly developed services,
classified as value-added services, are fully liberalized. 3°° To comply
with EC pressure, Italy is currently trying to open some telecommunica-
tions markets to competition.30 1
B. Lesser Developed Countries That Were Granted an Extended
Deregulation Deadline30 2
1. Spain
ITT and the Spanish government created the Spanish PTT, Telefonica
De Espana ("Telefonica"), in 1924.303 Though legally a private com-
pany, 32.28% of Telefonica's shares are still held by the government. °4
The legislation policing the telecommunications market was very disor-
ganized until the Spanish Parliament passed the Telecommunications
Act (the "Act") in 1987.305 But the Act did little to deregulate the
market.
The Act did separate the regulatory functions of the government from
the operations of the monopoly provider,30 6 but Spain has been slow to
open its equipment market to competition. Only in 1991 did a law al-
lowing free sale of a basic telephone come into effect.30 7 Furthermore,
the Commission has expressed concern about the monopolization of ter-
minal equipment provision.30 8
Regulations, Reuter Textline, Sept. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (announcing that the proposed merger, which includes SIP, Italcable,
Telespazio, Sirm, and Iritel, conforms to EC competition regulations).
299. See Macconi & Giarda, supra note 292, at 90.
300. See id. at 89.
301. For example, Maurizio Pagani, the Posts and Telecommunication minister, wrote
to the EC that SIP's monopoly over GSM, the European radio-based mobile telephony
system, will cease at the end of April, 1993. See Italy: SIP's monopoly over GSM Mobile
Phones System to Cease, Reuters Textline, Oct. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CURNWS File; Belgium to examine EC demand to end GSM telephone monop-
oly, Oct. 1, 1993. Though this billion dollar industry has yet to be opened to competition,
the process is in motion. See Lisa Bannon, Battle for Italy's Cellular-Phone Market Pits
Top Industrialist in Personal Feud, Wall St. J., Feb, 25, 1994, at A9B.
302. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
303. See Jos6 Ma. Delgado, Telecommunications Law in Spain, in Telecommunications
Laws in Europe 111, 114-15 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993); see also Telefonica De Espana,
Hoover's Handbook of World Business, Dec. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CURNWS File.
304. See Delgado, supra note 303, at 114-115 n.13.
305. See id. at 111 n.1.
306. See id. at 112.
307. See id. at 117.
308. In 1991, the French company, Alcatel, sought to acquire control over its competi-
tor in the terminal equipment market, the Italian company, Telettra. Both of these com-
panies competed in Spain's terminal equipment market and, combined, they held 80% of
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For the most part, the Act and subsequent legislation have yet to open
services to competition.3" 9 The Act created classifications for different
services. It required basic services, such as basic telephony, telex, and
telegraph to be provided by Telefonica on a monopoly basis.3 1  One class
of services, carrier services, was originally retained by the monopoly pro-
vider, but was to be fully liberalized by January 1993.311 The Act did
open most value-added services to competition, requiring entrants only
to comply with standardization and authorization requirements. 3 ' 2 But
the Act reserved even some value-added services for monopoly con-
trol.31 3 Spain needs time to first organize control over its market, but it
should soon be prepared to work towards open competition.
Similarly, the Portuguese government is especially reluctant to remove
its monopolistic control over telecommunications provision because, as
of 1990, of all EC countries, it has the least number of telecommunica-
tions lines per inhabitant.314 Thus the government fears that open com-
petition will leave many inhabitants with no service at all.3" The
Portuguese PTT ("CTT") was a public company under the political au-
thority of the Ministry. 16 CIT provided almost all postal services and
telecommunications services. Only two other carriers were able to obtain
government concessions to provide services. The first was Telefones de
Lisboa e Porto, a public company which provided telephony in Lisbon
and Oporto. The second was Companhia Portugesa Radio Marconi,
which provided intercontinental telephone and telex services, interna-
tional telegraphy (apart from Spain), and intercontinental links for new
services such as the data network. These two companies share a board of
directors, whose members are nominated by the government. Portugal
the market. The Commission was concerned that this merger would end competition in
the Spanish terminal equipment market. Though Telefonica did not object to the merger,
other suppliers did, and claimed that Telefonica was biased because it held shares in both
companies. These shares, they claimed, protected Telefonica and created a barrier to
market entry. The EC eventually allowed the merger when Telefonica sold its shares in
the two companies, and agreed to make diverse purchases, thus ensuring competitors a
place in the market. See Wayne D. Collins, The Coming ofAge of EC Competition Policy,
17 Yale J. Int'l L. 249, 289 (1992) (reviewing Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and
Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991)); The Commission Imposes Strict
Obligations in its Approval to the Alcatel/Telettra Merger, IP Press Release, Apr. 12,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
309. See Delgado, supra note 303, at 112-13.
310. See id. at 113.
311. See icL at 113-15.
312. See id. at 113. The definition of value added services ("VAS") varies in each coun-
try, complicating efforts to arrive at a uniform definition. In Spain, VAS are defined as
services, other than broadcasting, which use basic or enhanced services but add other
facilities such as data processing, access, storage, or retrieval, to satisfy additional tele-
communications requirements. See id at 116.
313. See id at 117. Value added services that require the installation and use of a
network are not opened to competition. Id
314. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 442 (table 5).
315. See supra note 215.
316. See Ungerer, supra note 35, at 26-28.
2195
2196 FORDHAM LAWREVIEW [Vol. 62
plans a consolidation of its separate operators, similar to Italy's plan.3"'
2. Greece
Greece has been the slowest EC country to develop its telecommunica-
tions markets.31" Greece is disadvantaged due to infrastructural, organi-
zational, and political problems.3 9 Nevertheless, Greece has attempted
to implement laws to increase telecommunications competition.320
Until recently, Greek telecommunications were controlled by the Hel-
lenic Telecommunications Organization SA, which was publicly owned,
but financially autonomous, as required by statute. 32  Greece's first step
towards deregulation was a 1990 law that granted private entities the
right to compete in mobile and value-added services markets.322 In addi-
tion, on July 31, 1992, Greece enacted a law calling for a separation be-
tween the telecommunications regulator and the telecommunications
provider.32 3 It also called for partial privatization of the Greek PTT.324
Recently, a political shift slowed Greek deregulation, 325 but much of the
PTT is already privately owned.326 Due to Greece's particular problems,
it probably will not achieve open competition in its telecommunications
markets in the near future, but may be able to break its telecommunica-
tions monopoly into a private oligopoly.327
C. The Current State of Telecommunications and Prospects for
the Future
It is difficult to quantify the present level of telecommunications dereg-
ulation in the EC. In some ways, much deregulation remains to be im-
plemented before European telecommunications are truly open to
competition.328 State owned monopolies still control the majority of EC
317. See Adonis, supra note 228.
318. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 435 ("Until August 1992 Greece had been the
only EC member state without a restructured institutional framework for the develop-
ment of the telecommunication sector.").
319. See id. at 443.
320. See id. at 443-45.
321. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 435.
322. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 436. Constantelou refers to Article 93 of Law
1892 of 31 July 1990 which haw been translated as stating that
[u]nder Presidential decree, and after a proposal submitted by the Minister of
Transport and Communications after consultation with the Administrative
Council of [the Greek PTT], it is possible for other public or private bodies to
undertake the organization and use of mobile communications services and
value-added services by having access to the existing [telecommunications]
network.
Id.
323. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 440-41 (translating and interpreting the new
law).
324. See id. at 441.
325. See Adonis, supra note 228.
326. See Constantelou, supra note 8, at 441.
327. See id. at 444.
328. See Oster, supra note 19 (noting that, despite open competition in some telecom-
munications markets, "[t]he telephone industry ... will not be deregulated until 1998").
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telephone services,3 2 9 and each EC Member State (except for Britain)
still offers "exclusive rights" to a single telecommunications company. 3
But much has been opened to competition and there are strong move-
ments for even more deregulatory legislation.
Most market analysts believe that the balance within Europe is tipping
in favor of liberalization, especially considering the latest proposals for
full liberalization of all voice telephony in the EC, to be phased in over a
number of years.3 In a recent display of optimism, telecommunications
ministers from all European nations agreed that most EC countries
should end monopolies over telephone calls by 1998, giving Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal, and Spain until 2003.332 In addition, most European
countries have attempted to create open competition in the cellular
phone market, despite the fact that they could legally allow monopoly
control.333 Furthermore, the Commission has established its intention to
fully liberalize satellite communications in the near future. a 4
Though most analysts now agree that the monopolistic control by
PTTs does not benefit telecommunications users,335 some countries still
oppose open competition. Belgacom, Belgium's PTT, and France
Tilicom (described by a Brussels insider as "a bank that happens to run
telecoms services" 336 ) are the staunchest opponents to deregulation.
Even the Competition Commissioner, Belgian Socialist Karl van Miert,
is less enamored with the free market than his predecessor, Sir Leon Brit-
tan. Furthermore, Jacques Delors, the Commission's president, was
hesitant to implement any controversial EC measure before Germany,
Denmark, and Britain ratified the Maastricht Treaty.338 This was
pointed to as an indication that he is unlikely to endorse any radical
legislation against Member States' wishes.
Critics of deregulation point out that open competition may result in
329. See Hilary Clarke, Survey of International Telecommunications, Fin. Times, Oct.
15, 1992, at IIl.
330. See Suzanne Perry, Article 90 Confirmed as Commission Anti-Monopoly Weapon,
Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Nov. 17, 1992; EC Commission's Monopoly-Busting Pow-
ers Upheld, Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 17, 1992.
331. See Still Holding: European Telecoms, supra note 85.
332. See Europe's Companies Back Telecoms Liberalization, Survey Shows, Reuter Eur.
Community, Sept. 20, 1993.
333. See Andrew Adonis & Nikki Tait, Mobiles break into the big time: Con cellular
communications replace traditional networks, Fin. Times, Aug. 19, 1993, at 15.
334. See Scherer, supra note 41, at 7-8. For an analysis of the steps taken to deregulate
satellite services, see generally Oliver Stehman, Facility-Base Competition in Europe: The
Case for a Separate Satellite System, 1992 Telecommunications Policy 135 (charting the
effects of technological progress on the relationship between terrestrial and satellite tele-
communication networks).
335. See Beaton, supra note 38, at 689 ("there is no need to maintain the core monop-
oly[,] and... service, quality and price opportunities are best achieved by competition in
basic and enhanced services").
336. See Still Holding: European Telecoms, supra note 85.
337. See id.
338. See id The Maastricht Treaty was recently adopted under the German constitu-
tion, which completed its ratification process. See supra note 218.
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short-term dangers to consumers.33 9 For example, while monopolies
over voice telephony are still allowed, the PTTs might increase the price
of basic service to compensate for loss of revenues in other markets.3 40
In addition, the quality of the networks that PTTs still operate might
drop due to restricted budgets resulting from losses in competitive mar-
kets.341 Others have criticized the EC's deregulation attempts, claiming
that "EC policy [is] unclear," and that it has impeded the efforts of Euro-
pean companies attempting to achieve global competitiveness.342 But
most analysts have accepted the reality that deregulation is coming,
though it will still take a lot of work.343
CONCLUSION
Over the last six years, the Commission has made strong advances to-
wards the deregulation of European telecommunications, most impor-
tantly by establishing its authority over the Member States' PTTs. In
light of the recent proposal to deregulate even voice telephony, 344 it
seems that the PTTs are destined to disintegrate. Enough businessmen
and politicians now understand the need for open competition in tele-
communications that even if the voice telephony proposal is rejected,
complete deregulation is still inevitable.
The road ahead, however, remains long and complicated. Though
some countries have approached their goal of full deregulation, others
are more entrenched in their traditional, monopolistic, telecommunica-
tions organizations. Despite these difficulties, recent developments have
indicated that all European telecommunications markets will be deregu-
lated within the decade.
339. See Naftel, supra note 2, at 488-91.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 489-90.
342. See Williamson, supra note 68; Austin, supra note 10, at 112 (noting that some
criticize the ONP Directive as "merely adding another cumbersome procedure to an al-
ready lengthy process. Since many of the Members of the ONP Committee are the same
individuals who serve on the Council working groups, debate tends merely to be shifted
from one Committee to the next."). Another criticism aimed at the ONP Directive is
that it leaves unresolved the issue of which services it applies to. See Higham, supra note
58, at 247-49 (discussing the options for how to proceed with the ONP process); John M.
Wheeler, Key Issues in Europe's Open Network Provision: The Case of the German VANS
Providers, 1992 Telecommunications Policy 80, 83-87 (discussing the options on which
markets to apply ONP, and explaining who supports the different options).
343. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 10, at 117 (concluding that the attention devoted to
European liberalization "gives reason for optimism that freer markets in Europe will be
the ultimate destination of the ONP process"); Beaton, supra note 38, at 702-03 (predict-
ing a future in which "[t]raditional notions of monopoly-based products and services will
be gone"); Josephine Ludolph, The EC's accomplishments in and prospects for a single
market in services, Business America, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File,
Mar. 8, 1933 ("The market-integrating laws are in place. However, all of the EC Member
States still have work ahead of them.").
344. See supra note 26.
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